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Cognitive and Neural Processes of Constucted Preferences
Abstract
Past research has identified many ways in which decisions are influenced by the context of the decision
environment. In this dissertation, we use eye-tracking and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
to investigate the processes and strategies individuals use in different decision contexts. The first two
chapters use eye-tracking to extract fine-grained process data that uncover the different strategies that
individuals employ in response to changes in the decision environment. Chapter 2 investigates how
decision processes change in response to different modes of preference elicitation. We find that
preferences for gambles shift between choice and bid elicitation. More importantly, these preference
reversals are accompanied by differential attention to gamble attributes (probability of winning versus
amount to win), suggesting that these reversals are due to differential weighting of these attributes in the
two contexts. Chapter 3useseye-tracking to investigate how decision strategies shift as the number of
options and time pressure increases. In response to an increasing number of choice options, all subjects
consider only a subset of the options before making a decision, in which the value of a single attribute
(the probability of winning) has the largest effect on whether an option is considered. Critically, those
experiencing time pressure tended to then use a simpler attribute-based strategy to choose amongst the
subset of options considered, while those not under time pressure tended to use a compensatory
tradeoff-based strategy.Chapter 3 highlights how eye-tracking can be especially useful in detecting subtle
changes in decision strategies. In the final study, we use fMRI data and multi-voxel pattern analysis to
understand how decision strategies are represented in the brain. Overall, we find that different forms of
task complexity recruit similar neural regions across the frontal and parietal cortices, which have
previously been implicated as responding in a non-specific manner to general cognitive demands.
However, inconsistent with a general or non-specific role in cognitive demand, multi-voxel pattern analysis
can distinguish different forms of task complexity in all of these regions. Given that different forms of
task complexity evoke different decision strategies, this suggests that fMRI could potentially be used to
decode or predict the decision strategies individuals are using. Taken together, this work furthers our
understanding of how decision processes changes in response to changes in the task context and
suggests important future directions for using eye-tracking and fMRI to identify the processes and
strategies individuals use to make a decision.
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ABSTRACT
COGNITIVE AND NEURAL PROCESSES OF CONSTRUCTED PREFERENCES
Betty K. Viechnicki
Joseph W. Kable

Past research has identified many ways in which decisions are influenced by the context of the
decision environment. In this dissertation, we use eye-tracking and functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) to investigate the processes and strategies individuals use in different decision
contexts. The first two chapters use eye-tracking to extract fine-grained process data that uncover
the different strategies that individuals employ in response to changes in the decision
environment. Chapter 2 investigates how decision processes change in response to different
modes of preference elicitation. We find that preferences for gambles shift between choice and
bid elicitations. More importantly, these preference reversals are accompanied by differential
attention to gamble attributes (probability of winning versus amount to win), suggesting that these
reversals are due to differential weighting of these attributes in the two contexts. Chapter 3 uses
eye-tracking to investigate how decision strategies shift as the number of options and time
pressure increases. In response to an increasing number of choice options, all subjects consider
only a subset of the options before making a decision, the value of a single attribute (the
probability of winning) having the largest effect on whether an option is considered. Critically,
those experiencing time pressure tended to then use a simpler attribute-based strategy to choose
amongst the subset of options considered, while those not under time pressure tended to use a
compensatory tradeoff-based strategy. Chapter 3 highlights how eye-tracking can be especially
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useful in detecting subtle changes in decision strategies. In the final study, we use fMRI data and
multi-voxel pattern analysis to understand how decision strategies are represented in the brain.
Overall, we find that different forms of task complexity recruit similar neural regions across the
frontal and parietal cortices, which have previously been implicated as responding in a nonspecific manner to general cognitive demands. However, inconsistent with a general or nonspecific role in cognitive demand, multi-voxel pattern analysis can distinguish different forms of
task complexity in all of these regions. Given that different forms of task complexity evoke
different decision strategies, this suggests that fMRI could potentially be used to decode or
predict the decision strategies individuals are using. Taken together, this work furthers our
understanding of how decision processes changes in response to changes in the task context and
suggests important future directions for using eye-tracking and fMRI to identify the processes and
strategies individuals use to make a decision.
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CHAPTER 1 – Introduction
The way people make decisions has long been a subject of intense study by educators,
business people, and researchers. A long-standing approach to understanding how people
make decisions is assuming a rational choice framework, where the decision maker has welldefined, stable preferences that do not depend on the circumstances of the decision
environment. Therefore, the decision maker’s choice among different options should be
consistent, coherent, and determined only by relevant results (McFadden, 1999). For
example, if an individual is willing to wait longer to eat at restaurant A than to eat at
restaurant B, then the individual should also be willing to pay more to eat at restaurant A than
at restaurant B (consistency). If an individual is willing to pay more to eat at restaurant A
than at restaurant B, and more for restaurant B than restaurant C, then the individual should
be willing to pay more for restaurant A than restaurant C (coherence). If a new restaurant
opened, restaurant D, then the choice between eating at restaurant B and restaurant C should
not depend on whether the irrelevant restaurant D option is included in the choice set.
Yet, decades of psychological research have demonstrated that people often do not
behave in line with rationality, and individuals may not always exhibit consistent and welldefined preferences (for reviews, see Kahneman, Slovic, and Tvserky, 1982; Mellers,
Schwartz, and Cooke, 1998; Shafir and LeBoeuf, 2002). For instance, individuals may
change their preference for one option over another when a third option is introduced (Huber,
Payne, and Puto, 1982), and preferences for insurance coverage may change depending on
how premiums are framed (Johnson et al., 1993). Additionally, a classic example, coined the
preference reversal phenomenon, demonstrated that individuals prefer gamble A over gamble
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B when making a choice between the two, but when making a numerical evaluation of the
two gambles, individuals prefers gamble B over gamble A (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971).
This finding has been replicated many times in spite of efforts to try to eradicate the effect
(Grether and Plott, 1979).
Alternative frameworks to rational choice theory have been suggested for how people
make decisions. One viewpoint is that individuals do not necessarily construct preferences,
but instead make decisions based on rules and heuristics (March, 1994). In this viewpoint,
subjective values of options are not necessarily calculated to make a decision. Instead,
decision-making may involve the application of simple rules or principles to the decision
situation, which minimizes the effort to make a decision. For instance, individuals may rely
on simple heuristics, or rules of thumb, in response to the decision environment. Individuals
may have a toolbox of simple heuristics that are often one-attribute judgments, which
involves considering only the most important attribute without having to make any tradeoffs
(Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999). Additionally, individuals may make decisions based on norms
or conventions housed within their own social identity (March, 1994).
Another viewpoint is that people construct their preferences, but preferences are not
necessarily well-defined or stable. Two central tenets of the constructed preference view is:
1) individuals do not just simply refer to a master list of preferences from memory, and 2)
preferences are not necessarily generated by applying some task invariant algorithm of utility
(Bettman, Luce, and Payne, 1998). Instead, how an individual makes a decision may be
contingent upon a variety of factors and characteristics related to the decision environment.
These factors may differentially highlight specific attributes of the decision environment and
may also evoke different processing for combining information (Mellers, Schwartz, and
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Cooke, 1998). Thus, preferences and the processes leading to preferences may be highly
sensitive to the decision environment.
The constructed preference view of decision making has been around in psychology
for many years (Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic, 1988; Slovic, 1995; Bettman, Luce, and Payne,
1998; Warren, McGraw, and Van Boven, 2011). Moreover, a considerable amount of
research has identified a variety of task factors (e.g., numbers of alternatives, time pressure,
the way in which preferences were elicited), and context factors (e.g., range of options,
similarity among alternatives) that affect how preferences are constructed (for reviews, see
Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1993; Mellers, Schwartz, and Cooke, 1998; Warren, McGraw,
and Van Boven, 2011). However, many studies have relied on choice or outcome data to
explain construction processes, which at times makes it difficult to distinguish the different
construction processes that lead to the choice. Some researchers have adopted process
tracing methods, such as information boards and mouselab, to observe the order in which
subjects search and acquire information during a decision task (e.g., Bigg et al., 1985;
Billings and Marcus, 1983; Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1988). But, these early process
measures require subjects to either position a mouse over different windows or turn over all
for information and so, may not always provide the most natural decision environment
(Lohse and Johnson, 1996)."
Here, in this dissertation, I take on the view that preferences are constructed, and that
preferences are often influenced by the circumstances of the decision environment. Crucially,
this dissertation brings new techniques to uncover the construction processes that lead to
preferences. A main strategy of this dissertation is to use eye-tracking to extract more finegrained process data to uncover the different strategies that individuals may employ in
3"
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response to changes in the decision environment. Eye-tracking provides a more natural
measure of visual attention by monitoring eye position and movement without imposing
additional requirements on subjects to obtain or maintain information. The first two studies in
this dissertation use eye-tracking to further elucidate how people acquire information to
construct their preferences in two specific contexts.
Additionally, in this dissertation, we explore constructed preferences on a neural
level and use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure brain activity and
multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) to further understand how these responses to different
task demands are processed in the brain. Previous studies using traditional univariate
methods have implicated a set of regions in the parietal and frontal cortices, often coined as
the multiple-demand network, responding in a non-specific manner to general cognitive
demands (Duncan and Owen, 2000; Federenko, Duncan, Kanwisher, 2013). However, we
investigate neural activity at a finer-grained level and use MVPA to test whether the different
responses to different forms of task complexity can be distinguished in these regions, which
would go against previous studies suggesting that these regions serve as a general demand
network. More importantly, the ability to distinguish on neural level may then prove fruitful
in identifying and furthering our understanding of the neural and cognitive processes
underlying different decision strategies and in turn, the processes that lead to our preferences
during decision making.
Research Overview
In chapter 2, I revisit a classic example of how preferences change in response to
changes in choice situation and use eye-tracking to better explain this behavioral phenomena.
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In this classic example, people exhibit systematic preference between choices and bids. For
two gambles matched in expected value, people systematically chose the higher probability
option but provided a higher bid for the option that offered the greater payoff. Different
studies attribute preference reversals to changes in how attributes are weighted (Tversky,
Sattath, and Slovic, 1988), changes in how attributes are combined to form an evaluation
(Mellers, Ordonez, and Birnbaum, 1992), or changes in how a formed evaluation is
expressed in different tasks (Goldstein and Einhorn, 1987). In our study, we replicated the
classic behavioral effect, and our subjects demonstrated a robust preference reversal effect in
the predicted direction. Even more critically, we found that preference reversals were
accompanied by a shift in fixations on the two attributes, with people fixating on
probabilities more during choices and on amount more during bids. Our results support that
preference reversals may be due to changes in attribute weights. Additionally, using a natural
measure of visual attention, our results suggest that the construction of preferences during
decision making depends partly on task context because our tasks differentially directs
attention at the two attributes.
In chapter 3, I describe another eye-tracking study that explored decision-making
under a different type of task effect, changes in task complexity. This study highlights how
eye-tracking can be especially useful in detecting subtle changes in decision strategies. In this
study, we investigated how people make decisions on gambles in response to increases in the
number of options and added time pressure. A number of different strategies have been
proposed in trying to explain how people make decisions in response to these increases in
complexity. However, past studies have mainly relied on behavioral choice data and coarsegrained process measures (e.g., mouselab; Lohse and Johnson, 1996) that may not have the
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sensitivity to pick up intricacies of a decision strategy in these complex situations. Our
results suggested that all of our subjects reduced the option set based on probability,
eliminating options with lower probability. However, subjects not experiencing time pressure
were then more likely to evaluate both the probability of winning and the payoff from the
remaining option set, while those experiencing time pressure were more likely to then only
evaluate the payoff from the remaining options. By using eye-tracking, we were able to find
subtle and dynamic shifts in strategies in response to increasing complexities in our tasks.
Our study also demonstrated novel ways of analyzing eye-tracking to further understand how
decisions are made.
In chapter 4, I describe an fMRI study in which we investigate the neural responses to
different manipulations of task complexity. In chapter 3, we found subtle differences in
decision strategies in response to task complexity. In this study, we investigated the neural
signatures of these different strategies in response to task complexity. Consistent with
previous findings, our results showed widespread activation across regions that have been
implicated as general demand areas (e.g. dmPFC, SMA, parietal cortices, insula, dlPFC).
However, inconsistent with a general or non-specific role in cognitive demand, multi-voxel
pattern analysis can distinguish different forms of task complexity in all of these regions.
These results extended our understanding of how responses to different manipulations of
complexity are represented in the brain and suggests that fMRI could potentially be used to
decode or predict the difficulty manipulation from activity. An important next step would
then attempt to decode and predict the specific strategy used in a particular decision situation.
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CHAPTER 2 – Preference reversals in decision making under risk are accompanied by
changes in attention to different attributes
Kim, B., Seligman, D., and Kable, J.W. (2012). Frontiers in Decision Neuroscience, 6(109)
Abstract
Recent work has shown that visual fixations reflect and influence trial-to-trial variability in
people’s preferences between goods. Here we extend this principle to attribute weights
during decision making under risk. We measured eye movements while people chose
between two risky gambles or bid on a single gamble. Consistent with previous work, we
found that people exhibited systematic preference reversals between choices and bids. For
two gambles matched in expected value, people systematically chose the higher-probability
option but provided a higher bid for the option that offered the greater amount to win. This
effect was accompanied by a shift in fixations of the two attributes, with people fixating on
probabilities more during choices and on amounts more during bids. Our results suggest that
the construction of value during decision making under risk depends on task context partly
because the task differentially directs attention at probabilities versus amounts. Since recent
work demonstrates that neural correlates of value vary with visual fixations, our results also
suggest testable hypotheses regarding how task context modulates the neural computation of
value to generate preference reversals.
Introduction
A challenge for theories of decision making under risk is to account for known
systematic inconsistencies in people’s decisions. An example is the “preference reversal
phenomenon,” which involves systematic inconsistencies between preferences and prices
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(Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Lichtenstein and Slovic 1973; Grether and Plott, 1979).
Preference reversals were initially demonstrated by Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971). When
given a choice between two gambles of similar expected value, one with a high probability of
winning a smaller amount of money (termed the P-bet) and another with a low probability of
winning a larger amount (termed the $-bet), most people choose the higher probability P-bet.
However, when providing selling prices for the same exact gambles, most people assign a
higher price to the larger amount $-bet. These two decisions appear to be mutually
inconsistent. The P-bet cannot be simultaneously better than and worse than the $-bet, and
one would expect people to demand a higher price for their preferred gamble. Preference
reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance, whereby preferences should not
change depending on how they are measured (Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman, 1990;
Stalmeier, Wakker, and Bezembinder,1997).
Despite its apparent irrationality, the preference reversal phenomenon is remarkably
robust. For specifically designed alternatives, the frequency of reversals can be greater than
50% (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1973; Grether and Plott, 1979; Tversky, Slovic, and
Kahneman, 1990). The basic inconsistency has been replicated numerous times by
psychologists and experimental economists, including under different designs using nongamble stimuli and various incentive mechanisms (Mowen and Gentry, 1980; Tversky,
Slovic, and Kahneman, 1990; Mellers, Ordónez, and Birnbaum, 1992; Mellers, Chang,
Birnbaum, and Ordónez, 1992). Further, preference reversals persist in the face of large
incentives (Grether and Plott, 1979; Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1973), including when the
experimenter exploits the inconsistency to take money from the subject (Chu and Chu, 1990;
Berg, Dickhaut, and O’Brien, 1985).
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Various explanations have been proposed for preference reversals, which attribute the
reversal to changes at different stages of the decision process. Different theories attribute
preference reversals to changes in how attributes are weighted (Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic,
1988), changes in how weighted attributes are combined to form an evaluation (e.g., additive
versus multiplicative combination; Mellers, Ordónez, and Birnbaum, 1992), or changes in
how a formed evaluation is expressed, or translated into a response, in different tasks
(Goldstein and Einhorn, 1987). Though conceptually distinct, changes at these different
stages are also not mutually exclusive.
A prominent explanation for preference reversals is Tversky, Sattath and Slovic’s
(1988) contingent weighting hypothesis. They argue that attribute weights are closer to
lexicographic (i.e., closer to all-or-none) in choice compared to other tasks, which leads to
the most important attribute being weighted even more heavily in choice, a phenomena called
the prominence effect (Slovic, 1975; Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic, 1988). Since most people
are risk-averse (Holt and Laury, 2002), weighting probability more than amount, this would
lead to the probability dimension being weighted even more in choice than other decision
tasks. (Note there is some debate, though, about whether the prominence effect occurs for
gambles; see Tversky, Sattath and Slovic, 1998, p. 382). By contrast, Tversky, Sattath and
Slovic (1988) argue that the payoff dimension is weighted more during bids because of the
compatibility effect, whereby attributes that are compatible with the output are given more
weight (in this case, payoff is compatible with bids, since both are in dollars; Slovic, Griffin,
and Tversky, 1988; Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic, 1988). Formally, Tversky, Sattath and
Slovic (1988) model the change in responses across the two tasks as a change in the weight ai
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(where i = choice, bid) of the following utility function for a gamble to win amount a with
probability p:

U( p,a) = log p + α i log a
Note that this is simply the logarithmic transform of an expected utility model in which the
€
degree of risk aversion varies between choices and bids.
Here, using visual fixations as an index of information processing and visual
attention, we sought to determine what information people attend to during a preference
reversal paradigm. Specifically, we aimed to test whether visual fixations reflect changes in
the weighting of different attributes, with people looking at probability information more
during choices and amount information more during bids. Since preference reversals could
be due to changes at different stages of the decision process, this finding would also provide
additional support for contingent weighting being at least part of the explanation.
This experiment also builds on recent research linking visual fixations and
preferences. Rangel and colleagues have shown that visual fixations both reflect and
influence preferences between goods (Armel, Beaumel, and Rangel, 2008; Krajbich,
Camerer, Ledyard, and Rangel, 2009; Krajbich, Armel, and Rangel, 2010). Visual fixations
also modulate the neural correlates of preferences, with activity in ventromedial prefrontal
cortex and ventral striatum reflecting the value of the fixated item compared to the value of
item not fixated (Lim, O’Doherty, and Rangel, 2011). Here we test whether the link between
fixations and preferences generalizes to decision making under risk, and whether fixations
are further linked to attribute weights. Given the link between fixations and neural correlates
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of preferences, this evidence should also inform theorizing regarding the specific neural
signals that might be modulated by task context to give rise to preference reversals.
Our investigation follows previous process tracing studies by Johnson and colleagues
(Johnson, Payne, and Bettman, 1989; Schkade and Johnson, 1988). Using Mouselab, they
found that individuals spent proportionally more time looking at probability information
during choices than during bidding. However, Mouselab may not always provide the most
natural decision environment (Lohse and Johnson, 1996). In Mouselab, subjects acquire
information by positioning a mouse cursor over different windows, and the pattern of mouse
movements is recorded. This can increase the amount of effort needed to acquire
information, which can then alter the information processing behavior of subjects (Lohse and
Johnson, 1996). Eye-tracking does not have this problem. Since eye-tracking does not
impose additional requirements on subjects to obtain or maintain information, it might in
some cases provide a more sensitive or more accurate measure of information processing.
For this reason, as well as to build on recent work linking visual fixations and preferences,
we thought it was important to further investigate preference reversals using eye-tracking
techniques.
Materials and methods
Participants
Twenty-six paid volunteers from the University of Pennsylvania community
participated in this study. Data from two participants were discarded because their responses
suggested confusion regarding the bidding task. One participant’s bids were not positively
correlated with expected value, and the other participant bid higher than the amount to win in
several gambles. The mean age of our final sample (N = 24) was 23.6 years (age range: 19 11"
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29 years), and 52% were female. All participants gave written informed consent in
accordance with the procedures of the Institutional Review Board at the University of
Pennsylvania.
Tasks and stimuli
On each trial, subjects either made a choice between two gambles (choice trials) or
provided their evaluation of a single gamble (bid trials, see Figure 1). On choice trials,
subjects chose between two different gambles with varying probabilities (12%-95%) of
winning different amounts of money ($10-$98). On bid trials, subjects entered their
subjective evaluation of a gamble in dollar amounts. At the end of each session, one trial was
randomly selected, and participants were paid according to their decision on that trial. If
subjects won money, they received that money in addition to the show-up fee of $10.
We used E-Prime to present all behavioral stimuli (Psychology Software Tools,
Pittsburgh, PA). Subjects entered their responses using a keyboard. Subjects were presented
with a total of 100 bid trials and 100 choice trials in eight alternating blocks of 25 trials each.
In case placement of the probabilities and amounts biased decision-making, half the subjects
saw the amounts as the top number and the other half saw the probabilities as the top number.
All subjects saw the same set of gambles in the same order. During a choice trial, subjects
were presented with a screen with the word “Choose” for one second. They then saw a screen
with two gambles side-by-side and had unlimited time to choose between the two gambles.
Subjects pressed “1” to choose the gamble on the left side of the screen and pressed “0” to
choose the gamble on the right. During a bid trial, subjects were presented with a screen with
the word “Bid” for one second. They then saw a screen with a single gamble and had
unlimited time to enter their dollar bid. Subjects used the number keys to enter their bid and
12"
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submitted their response by pressing the “return” key. Once bids were entered, subjects were
unable to change their responses. Participants were instructed to bid the “smallest amount of
money [they] would be willing to exchange for the opportunity to play the gamble.”
Subjects went through a training period in the beginning to ensure understanding of
the task. Subjects had two practice trials for each of the trial types. On bid practice trials,
subjects were taken through a series of questions after they entered their bid. These questions
were used during training to ensure that subjects understood the bidding task and could
provide well-calibrated bids. First, subjects were asked if they would forego playing out the
gamble to take a counteroffer that was $1 higher than their bid. If they answered “no,” they
were told they bid too low and were asked to bid again. If subjects answered “yes,” they were
then asked if they would play out the gamble and forego taking a counteroffer $1 less than
their bid. If they answered “no,” they were told they bid too high and were asked to bid
again. Subjects repeated this process until they answered yes to both questions. These
questions were only asked on practice trials, and were not included on experimental trials.
In choice trials, one gamble had a high probability of winning a small amount of
money (termed the P-bet, e.g., 84% chance of $20), and the other had a low probability of
winning a larger amount (termed the $-bet, e.g., 24% chance of $70). Fifty pairs of P-bets
(ranging from a 70-95% chance of winning $10-$34) and $-bets (ranging from a 12%-37%
chance of winning $35-$98) were selected so that the P-bet and $-bet were approximately
equal in expected value (EV), with differences ranging from $0.00 to $0.09 and a median
difference of $0.02. Probability ranges were chosen based on previous studies (e.g.,
Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971) and ensured the ranges for P-bets and $-bets did not overlap.
See Table 1 for a list of gamble pairs. Amounts were chosen to provide a reasonable range of
13"
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expected values, given that subjects would be paid according to the outcome on a single trial.
No probability or dollar amount was used more than twice in the stimulus set. This stimulus
set was pre-tested in pilot behavioral subjects (n = 12) who demonstrated a robust preference
reversal effect, and has now been used in several studies in our laboratory. To encourage
participants to attend to each choice and avoid following a simple heuristic (such as always
choosing the higher probability gamble), ten of the fifty pairs were mismatched so that either
the P-bet or $-bet had a much higher EV. The EV across all gamble pairs varied from $8.10
to $29.23, with a median of $18.13. Each pair was presented twice during choice trials, with
the left-right placement of the gambles switching between presentations. The same gambles
used in the choice task were shown once individually in the bidding task. Thus for each
subject we have 100 choice and 100 bid trials where the stimulus on the left of the screen is
identical, and what differs is the presence of another gamble or the bid prompt on the right
side of the screen.
Both tasks were administered in an incentive compatible manner. At the end of the
experiment, participants rolled dice to randomly determine one bid or choice trial to be
played out for real money. If a choice trial was selected, participants were given the
opportunity to play the gamble that they chose, using a 100-sided die to determine the
outcome. For example, if the chosen gamble was a 75% chance of winning $21, a roll of 75
or below on the die would pay $21 and a roll of 76 or above would pay $0. If a bid trial was
selected, participants were paid using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) method, a
widely used incentive-compatible procedure (Becker, Degroot, and Marschak, 1964). The
subject’s bid on the selected gamble was compared to a randomly generated counteroffer
(between $0 and the amount to win), created by dividing the roll of a 100-sided die by 100
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and multiplying the resulting fraction by the amount to win. If the subject’s bid was higher
than the counteroffer, the subject played the gamble. If the subject’s bid was lower than the
counteroffer, the subject received the counteroffer amount. This method incentivizes
participants to bid their true valuation of the gamble, the amount at which they would be
indifferent between receiving their bid and playing the gamble. The amount of money
subjects won varied from $0 to $37.41 with a median of $21.
Eye-tracking
We used an Eyelink II head-mounted eye-tracker (SR Research Ltd., Mississauga,
Ontario, Canada) to monitor participants’ eye movements during the task. A camera imaged
the participant’s right eye at 250 Hz. Subjects sat approximately 18 inches from the screen
and were calibrated using a 9-point calibration. To manage eye drift and head movement, the
subject fixated on a black dot at the center of the screen after each trial and a drift correction
measured how much each subject’s measured gaze differed from the center of the screen.
The experimenter monitored drift corrections throughout the whole experimental session and
re-calibrated when the subject’s gaze drifted from the center. Eye-movements were recorded
during each trial between the time of the first stimuli and the time of the subject’s response.
Behavioral analysis
We used Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA) and SPSS (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL) to
analyze our behavioral and eye-tracking data. For each pair of gambles, we categorized
responses in the choice task according to whether the subjects chose the P-bet both times
(“chose P”), chose each bet once (“chose =”) or chose the $-bet both times (“chose $”).
Participants were consistent about 79% of the time, choosing the same gamble across both
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choices. In the bid task, we categorized responses according to whether the subject bid
higher on the P-bet (“bid P”), bid equal amounts for both bets (“bid =”) or bid higher on the
$-bet (“bid $”). Within the forty gamble pairs matched in expected value, we calculated two
measures of the preference reversal effect. One measure included all instances of increasing
preference for the $-bet (“weak P-to-$ reversals”), that is, when subjects chose the P-bet both
times then bid equal amounts, when they chose each bet once then bid higher on the $-bet, or
when they chose the P-bet both times then bid higher on the $-bet. The other measure
included only this last category, instances where the subject chose the P-bet twice and then
bid higher on the $-bet (“strict P-to-$ reversals”). We also calculated two similar measures
for reversals in the unpredicted direction, from the $-bet in choice to the P-bet in bids.
In addition, we estimated a model in both tasks that assumed subjects’ decisions were
a function of the expected utility (EU) of the gambles:

EU( p,a) = p × aα i
Here αi (where i = choice, bid) is a measure of risk aversion. An αi equal to one leads to risk
neutral decisions, an αi less€than one to risk averse decisions, and an αi greater than one to
risk seeking decisions. As mentioned in the introduction, one simple model of contingent
weighting is merely the logarithmic transform of this equation (Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic
1988). From that perspective, an αi equal to one means equal weighting, an αi less than one
means probability is weighted more strongly, and an αi greater than one means amount to
win is weighted more strongly.
For choices, we fit a logistic regression that assumed choice probabilities (cp) were a
function of the difference in expected utility between the two gambles:

cp(EU1, EU 2 ) =

1
1+ e
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β (EU1 −EU 2 )

We fit this equation for each subject to his/her observed choices using an iterative
optimization in MATLAB (fminsearch and fminunc) to find the maximum likelihood
estimate of αchoice and b . The αchoice’s of two subjects exceeded the boundaries that our model
could reliably estimate (0.17 < αchoice < 5.05), so we excluded both α’s from these subjects
from further analysis. For bids, we fit a model that assumed the subject’s bid was equal to the
expected utility of the gamble, using non-linear least squares in MATLAB. We obtained
almost identical results to those reported below if we fit αchoice and αbid using the logarithmic
transform of expected utility (i.e., the contingent weighting equation in the introduction).
Response time was calculated as starting from the onset of the stimuli and ending
when the participant submitted their responses.
Placement of the amounts and probabilities did not have any significant effects on
choice and bidding behavior (i.e., strict or weak P-to-$ reversals, αchoice or αbid). All ps > .10.
Eye tracking analysis
We used Data Viewer (SR Research Ltd., Mississauga, Ontario, Canada) for all preprocessing of the eye-tracking data and Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA) for all eye-tracking
analysis. The Eye-link II software automatically parses eye movement data into fixations,
blinks, and saccades based on standard saccade thresholds (velocity threshold = 30 °/s,
acceleration threshold = 8000 °/s2). Only fixations initiated after the onset of the gambles
were included in our analyses. Additionally, the EyeLink on-line parser denoted a blink when
the pupil was very small, or when the eye-camera image of the pupil was missing or severely
distorted by eyelid occlusion.
We defined regions of interest (ROI) corresponding to each amount and probability
within each trial. The size of the screen was 800 by 1200 pixels, and each ROI was
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approximately 280 by 320 pixels. There were four ROIs in choice trials, and two ROIs
during bid trials. For a controlled comparison between choice and bid trials, we focused our
analyses on only the two ROIs for the left gamble in choice trials, since these were visually
identical to and contained the same amount of physical space as the two ROIs in bid trials.
For fixations and looking durations (but not first fixations), we observed the same pattern of
results if we collapsed across all four ROIs in choice trials.
We included three dependent variables in our eye-tracking analyses: number of
fixations, looking duration, and the first fixation of each trial. For each of our dependent
variables, we ran an ANOVA with gamble type (P-bets versus $-bets), attribute (probability
versus amount), and trial type (choice versus bids) as within-subject factors and attribute
placement (probability on top versus amount on top) as a between-subject factor. We refer to
this ANOVA below as our between-task analysis. To test subsequent comparisons within a
trial type, we ran separate ANOVAs for choice trials and bid trials with gamble type (P-bets
versus $-bets) and attribute (probability versus amount) as within-subject factors and
attribute placement (probability on top versus amount on top) as a between-subject factor.
We refer to these ANOVAs below as within-task analyses. These analyses were all done
using raw fixation numbers and looking times, but we observed the same pattern of results if
we examined ratios of these variables (e.g., the ratio of fixations on probability versus
amount, etc.). Fixations and looking durations for gamble types and attribute were highly
correlated. All rs > .92, ps < . 001.
For fixations and looking durations (but not first fixations), placement of the amounts
and probabilities did not interact with the eye tracking effects reported below. There was,
however, an interaction between attribute and attribute placement for all three dependent
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measures. Subjects had more total fixations (mean = 5.69 ± 0.46 fixations versus mean 4.77
± .48 fixations; F(1, 22) = 33.37, p < .001), longer looking durations (mean = 1,718 ± 208 ms
versus mean = 1,337 ± 192 ms; F(1, 22) = 22.15, p < .001), and more first fixations (mean =
77 ± 3% versus mean = 23 ± 3%; F(1, 22) = 87.54, p < .001 ) for the attribute that was
presented on top.
Finally, to test for any effects of individual differences, we looked at the correlation
between each of our eye-tracking dependent variables (proportion of total fixations and
looking duration by trial type and gamble type; proportion of total fixations, looking
duration, and first fixations by trial type and attribute) and each of our behavioral variables
(number of strict and weak P-to-$ reversals, αchoice and αbid). This analysis excluded the two
subjects whose choice alphas exceeded the boundaries that we could reliably estimate (these
two subjects were also outliers in terms of the number of reversals, with neither making any
weak P-to-$ reversals while the minimum among the remaining subjects was 22 weak
reversals).
Results
Behavioral Results
Overall, subjects spent more time on bid trials than on choice trials. There was a
significant increase in response times from choice trials to bid trials, F(1,23) = 74.95, p <
.001. The average response time was 4,257 ± 549 ms during choice trials and 6,894 ± 485 ms
during bid trials. (Note that, presumably secondary to this reaction time effect, there were
also more total fixations, F(1,22) = 43.57, p < .001, and longer looking durations, F(1,22) =
40.45, p < .001, during bid trials than during choice trials.) Within bid trials, subjects took
longer to bid on $-bets than on P-bets, F(1,23) = 31.43, p < .001. The average response time
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for bids on P-bets was 6,381 ± 97 ms and the average response time for $-bets 7,394 ± 101
ms.
Subjects also demonstrated a robust preference reversal effect. During choice trials,
subjects chose the P-bet significantly more often than the $-bet, F(1,23) = 34.02, p < .001.
On average, subjects chose the P-bet both times for 66 ± 13% of the pairs, chose equally for
21 ± 4% of the pairs and chose the $-bet both times for 13 ± 3% of the pairs (see Figure 2a).
In contrast, subjects bid significantly higher on the $-bet than on the P-bet, F(1,23) = 18.22,
p < .001. Subjects bid higher on the $-bet for 61 ± 13% of the pairs, bid the same on both
gambles for 10 ± 2% of the pairs, and bid higher on the P-bet for 28 ± 6% of the pairs (See
Figure 2b). Subjects preferred the P-bet significantly more often when choosing than when
bidding, F(1,23) = 40.54, p < .001, and preferred the $-bet significantly less often when
choosing than when bidding, F(1,23) = 49.21, p <.001.
Across all gamble pairs, subjects exhibited increased preference for the $-bet in bids
more often than the reverse effect, F(1,23) = 104.37, p <.001. Subjects made weak P-to-$
reversals for 67 ± 5% of gamble pairs and weak $-to-P reversals for 10 ± 3% of gamble pairs.
Subjects also exhibited significantly more strict P-to-$ reversals, choosing the P-bet both
times and bidding higher on the $-bet, than strict $-to-P reversals, choosing the $-bet both
times and bidding higher on the P-bet, F(1,23) = 53.30, p < .001. Subjects made strict P-to-$
reversals for 37 ± 4% of gamble pairs and strict $-to-P reversals for less than 1 ± 1% of
gamble pairs. For pairs where the subject chose the P-bet both times, they bid an average of
$10.37 ± 2.35 higher on $-bet.
Preference reversals were also evident by changes in risk aversion, or attribute
weighting, in the two tasks. Subjects were risk-averse, weighting probability more, during
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choice trials (achoice = 0.77, se = ± .05). In contrast, subjects were close to risk-neutral,
weighting probability and amount almost equally, during bid trials (abid = 1.03, se = ± .01;
see Figure 2c and 2d). achoice’s were significantly smaller than abid’s, t(21) = -4.37, p < .001.
Eye-tracking Results
For eye-tracking analyses, our main dependent variables were number of fixations
and looking durations. Both of these variables showed strong effects of task context. In each
task, subjects looked more at the preferred gamble type (P-bet in choices, $-bet in bids) and
the more heavily weighted attribute (probability in choices, amount to win in bids).
Subjects looked at the preferred gamble type more, fixating on P-bets more often
during choice trials and $-bets more often during bid trials (Figure 3). This was evidenced by
a significant interaction between trial type and gamble type for both the number of fixations,
F(1, 22) = 44.25 , p < .001, and for the duration of fixations, F(1, 22) = 23.53 , p < .001, in
our between-task analysis. Looking within each task, subjects made significantly more
fixations on P-bets (mean = 8.73 ± .55) than on $-bets (mean = 7.55 ± .61) during choice
trials, F(1, 22) = 27.48, p < .001. Subjects also spent significantly more time looking at Pbets (mean = 2,229 ± 191 ms) than at $-bets (mean = 2050 ± 231 ms) during choice trials,
F(1, 22) = 7.77, p = .01. In contrast, during bid trials, subjects made more fixations on $-bets
(mean = 13.60 ± .98) than on P-bets (mean = 12.05 ± .93; F(1, 22) = 22.75, p < .001) and
spent more time looking at $-bets (mean = 4,213 ± 445 ms) than at P-bets (mean = 3,727 ±
405 ms; F(1, 22) = 16.68, p < .001).
Fixations of the two attributes, probability and amount, also differed between choice
and bid trials. Subjects were more likely to look at probabilities during choice and more
likely to look at amounts during bidding (Figure 4). This was evidenced by a significant
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attribute by trial type interaction for both number of fixations, F(1, 22) = 14.13, p < .01, and
looking durations, F(1, 22) = 4.29, p < .05, in our between-task analysis. Looking within
each task, subjects made significantly more fixations on probability (mean = 4.3 ± 0.32
fixations) than on amount (mean = 3.9 ± 0.30 fixations) during choice trials, F(1, 22) = 5.57,
p < .05. Similarly, subjects spent marginally more time looking at probability (mean = 1,126
± 122 ms) than at amount (mean = 1,012 ± 100 ms) during choice trials, F(1, 22) = 4.19, p =
.05 (This effect was more reliable when considering both gambles, instead of just the left
gamble: duration on probability = 2,121 ± 233 ms , duration on amount = 1,865 ± 191 ms,
F(1, 22) = 5.99, p < .05). In contrast, during bid trials, subjects made significantly more
fixations on amount (mean = 6.74 ± 0.53 fixations) than on probability (mean = 6.06 ± 0.47
fixations; F(1, 22) = 8.12, p < .01), and spent marginally more time looking at amount (mean
= 2,137 ± 220 ms) than at probability (mean = 1,832 ± 237 ms; F(1, 22) = 2.97 p <.10).
Further, the difference in attribute fixations in the two trial types was more
exaggerated for $-bets than for P-bets. This was evidenced by a significant three way
interaction between trial type, gamble type and attribute for both fixations, F(1, 22) = 5.43, p
< .05, and for looking duration, F(1, 22) = 11.32, p < .01, in our between-task analysis.
We also examined which attribute was fixated on first in choice and bid trials. First
fixations were more likely to be on probability than on amount across both kinds of trials
(mean first fixation on probability = 59 ± 13%; F(1, 22) = 9.70, p < .01 in our between-task
analysis). Looking within each task, probability was more likely to be fixated on first in both
choice trials, F(1, 22) = 11.06, p < .01, and in bid trials, F(1, 22) = 4.62, p <.05. This was
qualified by a significant interaction between attribute and trial type (F(1, 22) = 5.88, p
<.05), with probability more likely to be fixated on first in choice trials (62 ± 5% in choice
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trials versus 55 ± 8% in bid trials). This interaction, however, was not reliable when we
included both choice options (all four ROIs) in the analysis, rather than restricting our
analysis to only the left choice option (F(1, 22) = 1.27, p >.10). The two-way interaction
between attribute and trial type was further qualified by a three-way interaction between
attribute, trial type and attribute order, F(1, 22) = 52.32, p < .001, in our between-task
analysis. This interaction arose because during bid trials, subjects primarily fixated on the top
attribute first (mean = 88 ± 3% of first fixations), regardless of whether it was probability or
amount. Subjects fixated on the top attribute first to a lesser degree during choice trials (67 ±
5% of first fixations). Thus it appears attribute placement had a stronger effect on first
fixations than attribute identity.
Finally, we tested for any effects of individual differences by examining the
correlations between the eye-tracking measures and behavioral measures. Only two of these
correlations were statistically significant. Individuals who fixated on the P-bet more during
choice (evaluated using either fixations or looking duration) were more risk-averse, rs = -.66
and -.61, ps <.001, respectively. Note these correlations remained significant even when
using a Bonferroni correction for the number of correlations examined.
Discussion
Here we replicated the preference reversal phenomenon in decision-making under
risk, in which people facing two gambles of equal expected value choose the one with the
higher probability of winning, but assign a higher price to the one with the larger potential
payoff. We have additionally shown that preference reversals are accompanied by changes in
visual fixations. Participants had more fixations on the preferred gamble in each task (P-bets
in choices, $-bets in bids). They also had more fixations on the more heavily weighted
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attribute in each task (probability in choices, amounts in bids). These results show that visual
fixations reflect preferences in decision making under risk, as they do in decisions about
goods (Krajbich, et al, 2009; Krajbich, Armel and Rangel, 2010), and that fixations may
further reflect attribute weights in a multi-attribute choice paradigm. These results support
that contingent weighting is part of the explanation for preference reversals, and also suggest
testable hypotheses about the neural mechanisms of preference reversals.
Behaviorally, we replicated the classic preference reversal finding. Our participants
predominantly chose the high-probability bet from a pair of gambles matched in expected
value, and predominantly assigned higher prices to the (alternative) bet that offered the larger
amount to win. For 37% of gamble pairs, our participants made strict P-to-$ reversals,
choosing the P-bet twice and bidding higher on the $-bet. Consistent with this, participants
were overall risk-averse during choices, and very slightly risk-seeking during bids.
One novel aspect of our paradigm compared to previous work is the highly repeated
nature of the trials. Participants made 100 choices and 100 bids over the course of the
experiment. Our results demonstrate that preference reversals are not eliminated when
subjects are tested with many repeated trials. Our design does not allow us to test whether
they are diminished by repeated trials, though the effects we observed in this experiment are
of similar size to those reported in the literature. Most neuroscientific methods require many
repeated trials and within-subject comparisons. While many context effects are eliminated
under these conditions, our results show that preference reversals are not, and therefore may
be a good paradigm for neuroscientific studies of context effects.
Despite only having to assess the value of one gamble, participants took longer to
make bids than to make choices. Although it is possible that the difference in response times
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might be due to differences in response entry, it is unlikely that pressing one or two more
buttons accounts for an increase of more than 2 seconds. Spending more time deciding on a
bid than choosing between two options is consistent with previous findings (Schkade and
Johnson 1988; Johnson, Payne, and Bettman 1989). It suggests that the decision process for
assigning prices is potentially more complex than that required for binary choices (e.g.,
multiplicative for bids versus additive for some choices; See Mellers, Ordónez, and
Birnbaum, 1992). This is consistent with models that assume that binary choice is the more
basic process (Johnson and Busemeyer, 2005), but not with models that assume pricing is
more basic (Luce, Mellers, and Chang 1993). Pricing and matching tasks have rarely been
studied in decision neuroscience (though see Plassmann, O’Doherty, and Rangel, 2007) so an
interesting question for future research is the degree to which choice and bidding rely on
shared versus distinct neural processes.
Recent work has found that fixations reflect trial-to-trial variability in preferences
(Krajbich, et al, 2009; Krajbich, Armel and Rangel, 2010). Our findings extend this principle
to decision making under risk. During choices, participants made more fixations on the
preferred gamble type in that task, P-bets, and spent a greater amount of time looking at Pbets. During bids, participants made more fixations on the preferred gamble type in that task,
$-bets, and spent a greater amount of time looking at $-bets. We acknowledge that the
bidding results are confounded by a longer reaction time for $-bets than for P-bets, making
this finding more difficult to interpret. There is not such a confound in the choice results,
however, which clearly replicate the link between fixations and preferences observed in other
choice domains.
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Our key finding, though, was that preference reversals were associated with changes
in visual fixations to the two gamble attributes in the two tasks. During bidding, participants
made more fixations on amounts and spent a greater amount of time looking at amounts.
During choices, participants made a greater number of fixations on probabilities and spent a
greater amount of time looking at probabilities.
The directionality of these results is broadly consistent with the contingent weighting
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, preference reversals may have resulted from
increased weight on probability in value computations during choice, and corresponding
increased weight on amount during bids. We found that people fixate probabilities more
during choice and amounts more during bids. It is also possible that these fixation patterns
may have also resulted from other processes than changes in attribute weights. Further
research should explore other possible processes that may affect fixation patterns, such as
changes in attribute spacing or similarities of the levels along an attribute (Mellers and
Biagini, 1994), during the preference reversal phenomenon.
These differences in fixations might only be an index of the differential weighting of
attributes, or alternatively might also be a cause of this differential weighting. This latter
possibility raises several ideas for future research that would involve exogenously controlling
fixations. If fixations influence attribute weighting, then preference reversals might be
reduced, or even eliminated, when participants are forced to look equally at probabilities and
amounts. In addition, forcing more fixations to the weaker attribute of an option might make
people less likely to choose that option, a potential exception to previous work showing that
fixating on an option makes people more likely to choose it (Armel, Beaumel, and Rangel,
2008).
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However, a simple model in which preference reversals are due solely to changes in
attribute weights, and fixations provide an unbiased index of these weights, has trouble
completely accounting for our data. As shown in Figure 2d, participants’ decisions reflect
nearly equal weighting of probability and amount during bids (i.e., participants are close to
risk neutral), and a greater weighting of probability during choices (i.e., participants are riskaverse). In contrast, as shown in Figure 4, participants fixate probabilities more during
choices and amounts more during bids.
One possible resolution is that people are intrinsically risk-averse, weighting
probabilities more, and only changes from that intrinsic baseline are reflected in changes
from equal fixation of the two attributes. Another possibility is that fixations are
monotonically, but not linearly, related to attribute weights. While participants are close to
risk-neutral during bids, they are still significantly risk-seeking, and they also fixate amounts
more than probabilities. A final possibility, of course, is that fixations and looking times
reflect more than attribute weights alone. For example, first fixations showed a strong effect
of the spatial position of attributes, and other influences could have shifted fixations similarly
in both choices and bids.
Our findings are similar to those reported previously by Johnson and colleagues
(Johnson, Payne, and Bettman, 1989; Lohse and Johnson, 1996). Using Mouselab, those
authors found that subjects attended to amounts more, and probabilities less, during bids than
during choices (for example, 56% versus 51% of the time in Experiment 1 of Schkade and
Johnson, 1988). This same overall pattern was arguably more dramatic in our fixation data.
This points to a potential difference in sensitivity between the two techniques, which might
arise from how people process information differently in the two environments. In the
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Mouselab environment, only one piece of information is available at any one time. Johnson
and colleagues noted that in their experiments some subjects used a strategy of first looking
at all of the information sequentially, and then holding it in mind while they made their
decision. Under free viewing, subjects do not adopt this strategy at all. Of the total fixations
in Figure 3, 3.59 ± .28 fixations during choice trials are made when returning to an item after
fixating on it once and then looking elsewhere, while 5.40 ± .42 represent return fixations
during bidding.
Our data on individual differences provide additional support for the notion that
fixations reflect preferences during choices. Individuals who fixated more on the P-bet
during choice trials were more risk-averse. However, we did not find any other significant
correlations between individual differences in eye movements and behavioral measures. A
possible reason for these null findings is that we have a small sample size for evaluating
individual differences. Additionally, most participants show a robust preference reversal
effect, so there is limited variability in the number of preference reversals. Future research
could further explore how individual differences in fixations related to individual differences
in preference reversals, perhaps using a larger sample or a paradigm in which there is greater
variance in the behavioral effect.
Future research could also investigate how different presentation formats affect eye
fixations and, in turn, preference reversals. For example, Johnson and colleagues (1988) have
shown that different presentation formats can move around preference reversals and that
these changes are associated with changes in information processing. Specifically, when
probabilities are more complex (e.g., 399/456) the number of preference reversals increases.
In addition, subjects spent a greater proportion of time viewing probability information when
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probabilities were displayed as hard fractions, and subjects who spent more time on
probability also demonstrated more reversals. We do not know of any similar studies looking
at the relationship between visual fixations and decisions under risk when presentation
format varies, though this would be an interesting follow-up to our study.
Another interesting question for future research concerns the neural mechanism of
preference reversals. Several studies have now demonstrated that neural activity in
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum is correlated with the subjective value of
the options under consideration during decision making (Kable and Glimcher, 2009). A
recent study showed that value-related activity in these regions is further modulated by visual
fixations, tracking the value of the fixated item compared to the item not fixated (Lim,
O’Doherty, and Rangel, 2011). Paired with our findings, this suggests the intriguing
hypothesis that neural activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum
differentially reflects probabilities and amounts during choices and bids. That is, in a
preference reversal paradigm, neural activity in these regions might be more strongly
affected by probabilities during choice and more strongly affected by amounts during bids.
Such a finding would also suggest that neural correlates of probability and magnitude
(Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, and Glover, 2005) could depend on the task context.
In conclusion, we found that preference reversals in decision making under risk were
accompanied by differential attention to probabilities versus amounts. The directionality of
this effect was consistent with a contingent weighting explanation (Tversky, Sattath, and
Slovic, 1988), with people looking at probabilities more during choice and amounts more
during bids. Given recent work demonstrating neural correlates of value (Kable and
Glimcher, 2009), which are modulated by visual attention (Lim, O’Doherty, and Rangel,
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2011), this work suggests testable hypotheses regarding how task-dependent strategies might
alter the weighting of attributes in the neural computation of value to cause preference
reversals.
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Figure 1. Choice and bid tasks. The sequences of events within a trial for both choice and bid trials
are shown. For choice trials, subjects saw “Choose” for 1 second. Subjects then saw two gambles, a
$-bet gamble and a P-bet gamble. Subjects had unlimited time to choose one of the gambles. After
submitting their response, subjects would see a check mark on the side of the chosen gamble. For bid
trials, subjects saw “Bid” for 1 second. Subjects then saw one gamble, either a $-bet or a P-bet
gamble, on the left side of the screen. To the right of the gamble was a “$” where subjects bids would
appear. Subjects had unlimited time to submit their bids. After submitting their response, subjects
would see the amount they bid.
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Figure 2. (A) Percentage of gamble pairs where subjects chose the P-bet option twice (P), the $-bet
twice ($), or both equally (=). On average, subjects chose the P-bet significantly more than the $-bet.
(B) Percentage of gamble pairs where subjects bid higher for the P-bet option (P), $-bet option ($), or
bid the same amount for both gambles (=). On average, subjects bid higher on $-bets than on the Pbets. (C) Average alpha values for choice trials and bid trials. Alphas were significantly higher for
bidding than for choice. (D) The average expected utility function for bids and choices given the
inferred alphas. Subjects were risk-averse during choices and slightly risk-seeking during bids.
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Figure 3. (A) Average number of fixations of $-bets and P-bets during choices and bids. (B) Average
duration looking at $-bets and P-bets during choices and bids.
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Figure 4. (A) Average number of fixations of probabilities and amounts during choices and bids. (B)
Average duration looking at probabilities and amounts during choices and bids.
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Table 1. List of gamble pairs used during the task. Each pair was shown twice during choice
trials. Each option was shown individually during bid trials.
$-Bet Option
Probability
Amount

P-Bet Option
Probability
Amount

12%

$71

86%

$ 10

19%

$48

83%

$11

14%

$73

85%

$12

15%

$72

83%

$13

23%

$50

82%

$14

17%

$71

93%

$13

16%

$80

71%

$18

14%

$93

77%

$17

29%

$46

79%

$17

18%

$75

90%

$15

20%

$68

85%

$16

16%

$87

77%

$18

32%

$46

92%

$16

19%

$80

72%

$21

17%

$93

75%

$21

24%

$70

84%

$20

26%

$66

78%

$22

27%

$64

91%

$19

29%

$62

72%

$25

21%
28%

$86

95%

$19

$65

91%

$20

22%

$83

76%

$24

33%

$58

87%

$22

33%

$58

87%

$22
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CHAPTER 3 – Simplifying strategies in response to increasing number of options and time
pressure: Behavioral and eye-tracking evidence

Introduction
While some decisions are simple, some can be quite complex. When making a simple
decision between two or three alternatives with an unlimited amount of time, people tend to
use a compensatory decision strategy, systematically processing all the relevant information.
Compensatory strategies involve making tradeoffs, where a good value one attribute can
make up for, or compensate, for bad values on other attributes (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson,
1993). Thus, the decision maker chooses the option with the best overall value among the
options, which often involves substantial computational processing of the information to
make the decision. However, other decisions are complex and demanding due to factors like
increasing the number of options or increasing time constraints, which amplifies the
computational demands of the decision context (Payne, 1976; Shugan, 1980; Svenson and
Edlan, 1987). When confronted with a more demanding decision-making situation, people
tend to move away from compensatory strategies and instead, adopt simplifying strategies
that are selective in the use of information (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1993; Shah and
Oppenheimer, 2008).
Here, we are less concerned with that fact that people simplify, and are more
interested in tracing out how their simplifying strategy changes incrementally as difficulty
increases. We think these incremental changes will elucidate why people simplify in the
ways they do in different contexts. In motivating our study, we first review the past literature
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identifying the many different types of decision strategies that have been suggested. We then
discuss the Adaptive Decision Maker framework (Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1993), which
could serve as a comprehensive framework for strategy selection and explain the multitude of
proposed strategies. Finally, we introduce the current study, focusing on how eye-tracking
permits a more detailed test of the adaptive decision maker idea than could be done with
behavior data alone.
A variety of simplifying strategies
Previous research has identified many different types of simplifying strategies in
response to increasing difficulty during decision making. These different simplifying
strategies may reduce the amount of cognitive effort or computational demands, compared to
what might be required by a compensatory strategy, when making a decision. Broadly
speaking, these strategies can be categorized into two types of decision strategies: 1) noncompensatory strategies and 2) combination of compensatory and non-compensatory
strategies.
First, a non-compensatory strategy often involves using heuristics or shortcuts to
simplify the decision context. These strategies do not involve systematically going through
all relevant information and involve using less computation processing of information than
compensatory strategies. A key distinction of non-compensatory strategies is that these
strategies do not involve making tradeoffs, so a good value on one attribute does not make up
for bad values on other attributes (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1993).
Several non-compensatory strategies have been proposed in response to increasing
demands in the decision environment. For instance, a common non-compensatory strategy
suggested in response to increasing number of options is a lexicographic strategy, which
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involves only evaluating the most important attribute and ignoring others to reduce the
amount of information processing needed to make a decision. The option that has the best
value on that attribute is then selected (Payne, 1976; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1993;
Schram and Sonnemans, 2008). Similarly, an elimination-by-aspects strategy (EBA;
Tversky, 1972) involves evaluating the most important attribute first and then eliminating
options that fall below a cutoff level for that attribute. The EBA process continues with the
second most important attribute, and so on, until one option remains. Additionally, another
noncompensatory strategy suggested in response to increasing demand is satisficing (Simon,
1955, 1956; Schwartz et al., 2002; Glockner and Herbold, 2011). A satisficing strategy
involves looking at the options one at a time until finding an option that reaches the threshold
of acceptability and is “good enough.” This option is then chosen and the evaluation process
is discontinued without looking at all the alternatives.
Second, a combination of compensatory and non-compensatory strategies involves
using these different strategies at different phases of the decision process. These combination
strategies may involve using a simple non-compensatory strategy to reduce the option set, but
then use a more extensive compensatory strategy to choose among the remaining options
(Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1993). Typically, a combination strategy may involve an
initial phase, where options are eliminated based off a cutoff level for an attribute, similar to
an EBA strategy. But instead of continuing on with a non-compensatory strategy, the second
phase of a combination strategy involves using a compensatory strategy to select among the
remaining options (Payne, 1976). Another example of a combination strategy is to initially
reduce the option set based on spatial arrangement instead of attribute information and then
search through that reduced subset to find the option with highest overall value (Reutskaja et
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al., 2011). These strategies may involve more computational demand than strategies that rely
solely on non-compensatory methods.
The adaptive decision maker reconsidered
In sum, previous researchers have proposed many different simplifying strategies that
people may use in response to increasing decision complexity. Yet, even as more strategies
are uncovered, we still understand very little about why people engage in one strategy over
another or why different strategies have been observed in response to similar decision
demands.
In the Adaptive Decision Maker, Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993) put forth one of
the earliest theoretical frameworks for why subjects engage in different decision strategies.
They argue that strategy selection is based on an effort-accuracy framework where
individuals adapt to a decision context by foregoing some accuracy to reduce effort. The
basic idea is similar to the speed-accuracy tradeoff widely studied in perceptual
psychophysics and cognitive psychology. Decisions strategies vary in the cognitive effort
required from the number of computational steps involved in reaching a selection and in
accuracy—the likelihood that the selection made matches the one that would result if
computational time were unlimited. Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993) illustrate the basic
aspects of the theory using simulations. Two factors, however, have limited the amount of
empirical data that have been brought to bear on this and other theories of strategy selection.
First, most studies have treated decision complexity or decision difficulty as a
categorical factor (e.g., not difficult vs. difficult). However, the adaptive decision maker
framework assumes the computation complexity of decision strategies varies on a continuum.
In other words, simplifying strategies depend on the level of difficulty of the task. More
40"
"

effortful task may elicit further simplifying strategies, like choosing based on one attribute of
the options, while less effortful decision contexts will require less simplification of the task
(e.g., satisficing). To really test this idea would require varying the difficulty of the decision
context more continuously, to push decision-makers to different points on the computational
complexity-accuracy tradeoff.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, we have lacked the techniques to detect and
discriminate between decision strategies at the level of richness required to test for
computation complexity-accuracy tradeoffs in detail. This shortcoming is in part because our
process measures of decision-making are relatively coarse-grained, compared to the nuances
of different decision strategies that need to be discriminated. Early process work involved
using information boards and mouselab to observe the order in which subjects search and
acquire information during a decision task (e.g., Bigg, et al., 1985; Billings and Marcus,
1983; Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1988; Creyer, Bettman, and Payne, 1989). However,
since Mouselab and information boards require subjects to either position a mouse over
different windows or turn over a cell for information, these methods may not always provide
the most natural decision environment (Lohse and Johnson, 1996). More recently,
researchers have used eye tracking to understand how people acquire information and come
to their judgments during decision-making tasks (e.g., Kuo et al., 2009; Reutskaja et al, 2011;
Venkatraman et al, 2009; Gloeckner and Herbold, 2011; Kim, Seligman, and Kable 2012).
Eye-tracking provides a more natural measure of visual attention by monitoring eye position
and movements without imposing additional requirements on subjects to obtain or maintain
information. Yet most previous eye-tracking studies have used relatively simple measures of
what options people look at and how they search for information.
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Overview of the current investigation
The current investigation investigates how decision making changes as the demands
of the decision environment increases. In line with previous work, we hypothesize that
people will adopt a simplifying strategy as the demands of the decisions increases. Critically,
our investigation aims to extend the adaptive decision maker framework by testing whether
strategy selection in response to incremental increases in difficulty changes in a gradual
rather than categorical manner. More specifically, we hypothesize that as the decision
increases in difficulty, subjects will shift from a combined compensatory and noncompensatory strategy to a simpler non-compensatory strategy. In order to test this, we take
two steps to enable more systematic examinations of computational complexity-accuracy
tradeoffs in decision strategy selection. First, we vary decision difficulty in a more
continuous rather than categorical fashion. Our task consists of simple gambles (e.g., 45%
chance of winning $30), and we vary decision difficulty in a couple of ways. The number of
options varies, as subjects choose one gamble among 2, 4, 8 or 16 gambles, and time pressure
varies, as some subjects experience time pressure and others do not. One trial is randomly
played out for each subject, which therefore incentives the subject to choose a “good option”
according to his or her preferences. Second, we try to extract as much information as possible
from our behavioral and eye-tracking measures about what decision strategies subjects may
be using. Our eye-tracking measures look separately at the different attributes within options,
consider how search patterns change over the course of a trial, and examine the joint
distributions of eye-tracking and behavioral data.
As we are able to show, it is possible to extract from eye-tracking measurements
more fine-grained process data that speaks to the different strategies that individuals may
42"
"

employ in the face of increasing decision difficulty. Specifically, we are able to test whether
subjects are actually employing the previously proposed strategies. More importantly, we are
also able to show that strategy selection in response to incremental increases in difficulty
changes in a gradual rather than categorical manner, as originally proposed in the Adaptive
Decision Maker (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1993). At less extreme levels of difficulty,
people use a combination strategy by using the available information (attribute levels, spatial
position) to reduce the choice set and choose in a compensatory manner from the smaller
reduced set (Payne, 1976; Reutskaja, 2011), while at more extreme levels of difficulty, this
strategy shifts towards a noncompensatory elimination-by-aspects type of strategy (Tversky,
1972).
Method
Participants and Procedures
Sixty-eight paid volunteers from the University of Pennsylvania community
participated in this study. Data from three participants were discarded due to technical
malfunctions during the experiment, and data from one participant was excluded due to
excessive head movement. The mean age of our final sample (n = 64) was 23.8 years, and
52% were female. The subjects were split into two different timing conditions: 1) without
time pressure (30 seconds time limit; n = 32) and 2) with time pressure (10 seconds time
limit; n = 32). All participants gave written informed consent in accordance with the
procedures of the human subjects review board at the University of Pennsylvania.
We used E-Prime to present the behavioral stimuli (Psychology Software Tools,
Pittsburgh, PA). On each trial, subjects chose one option among different gambles with
varying probabilities (7% - 99%) of winning different amounts of money ($3 - $200). The
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complexity of the decision task varied with the number of options for each trial. The number
of options varied over four levels: 2, 4, 8, and 16. See Figure 1a-d for examples of each trial
type. At the end of each session, one trial was randomly selected, and participants played out
the selected gamble from that trial. If subjects won the gamble, they would receive the
monetary reward in addition to the show-up fee of $10.
Stimuli Design
The gambles in our task were constructed based on a simple compensatory model,
expected utility (EU). The gambles in our experiment were all of the form where there was a
probability, P, of winning an amount of money, A, and a probability (1-P) of winning
nothing. The EU of each gamble in our experiment is then given by:
EU = P*Aα
Alpha (α) measures the curvature of the value function for gains and is the coefficient for
risk-aversion. An alpha less than 1 is risk-averse, an alpha above 1 is risk-seeking, and an
alpha equal to 1 is risk-neutral (choosing according to expected value). Although other
compensatory models exist, of course (e.g., prospect theory), we chose expected utility
because it was a simple one-parameter model.
We constructed the behavioral stimuli to have equal expected utility, assuming
different alpha levels. Alpha levels ranged from 0.5 to 1.1, increasing in .10 increments. Each
alpha level was also associated with four levels of average expected value (calculated by
taking the mean of the expected value of all the options), to ensure that the range of expected
values were similar throughout the task at each alpha level. The average expected values
were $9, $10, $11, and $12. One gamble in each choice, which we call the “pop-out”
option, had a higher expected utility than all the other options. Each alpha level was crossed
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with 4 of 5 levels of pop-out: 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, or 100% greater subjective value than
all the other options within that trial. There were 28 trials for each option type leading to a
total of 112 trials for the full task. All the gambles in the 8-, 4-, and 2-option trials were
constructed from the 16-option trials, with the pop-out always included in all trial types.
When we piloted the task, subjects (n = 10) did not notice the repeat gambles. Subjects also
had four training trials in the beginning to be acquainted with the task. Half the subjects saw
the amounts on top and the other half saw the probabilities on top. All subjects in both timing
conditions saw the same set of gambles.
Eye-tracking
An Eyelink II head-mounted eye-tracker (SR Research Ltd., Mississauga, Ontario,
Canada) monitored participants’ eye movements during the task. Subjects were seated
approximately 18 inches from the screen and were calibrated on a 9-point calibration.
Between trials, a black dot would appear in the middle of the screen for subjects to fixate on
in order to manage eye drift. This drift correction measured how much each subject’s gaze
and the central point differed over a short time period. The experimenter monitored the drift
corrections at all times, and re-calibrated when the subject’s gaze drifted from the center. The
number of re-calibrations varied by subject. Eye movements were recorded, starting from
the onset of the stimuli and ending when the participant submitted their responses. The
Eyelink II software automatically parses eye movement data into fixations, blinks, and
saccades based on standard saccade thresholds (velocity threshold = 30°/s, acceleration
threshold=8000°/s2). Only fixations initiated after the onset of the stimuli were included in
our analyses. We defined regions of interest (ROI) corresponding to each amount and
probability within each trial. The size of each ROI was approximately was 240 by 90 pixels.
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Analytical strategy
We used Data Viewer (SR Research Ltd., Mississauga, Ontario, Canada) for all preprocessing of the eye-tracking and Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA) and SPSS (SPSS Inc.,
Chicago, IL) to analyze our behavioral and eye-tracking data. We also used SAS (SAS
Institute Inc., Cary, NC) to examine, in both the behavioral and eye-tracking measures, linear
and non-linear changes in response to increases in the number of options. We estimated
mixed linear models using the MIXED procedure in SAS, which allowed us to choose the
appropriate covariance structures for each estimated model.
Behavioral analysis
Response times. Response time was calculated as starting from the onset of the
stimuli and ending when the participant submitted their responses to choose an option.
Estimating alpha. To calculate alphas, we fit a multinomial regression that assumed
choice probabilities were a function of the difference in expected utility between each option
and a reference option. We fit this equation for each subject to his/her observed choices using
an iterative optimization in MATLAB (fminsearch and fminunc) to find the maximum
likelihood estimate of alpha. Alpha values were estimated separately for each trial type.
Choices. We calculated the percentage of times the pop-out option was chosen, the
percentage of times the option with the highest expected utility was chosen (given that
subject’s alpha), the percentage of time the highest probability option was chosen, and the
percentage of time the highest amount option was chosen. We calculated these percentages
for 2-, 4-, 8-, and 16-option trials separately.
Eye-tracking analysis
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Proportion of options fully evaluated: Options were considered “fully evaluated” if
subjects looked at both the probability and the amount of the specific option.
Proportion of fixations on each attribute: We calculated the proportion of fixations
on amount and the proportion of fixations on probability separately for each of the trial types.
Fixation transitions: We categorized eye fixation transitions into 3 groups based on
the transition from the current fixation to the next fixation:
(1) Within-attribute: subjects looked at the same attribute in a different option as
their next fixation. We further categorized these transitions into scanning over probability or
scanning over amounts.
(2) Within-option: subjects looked at a different attribute within the same option as
their next fixation.
(3) Transitional: subjects looked at a different attribute in a different option as their
next fixation.
See Figure 2 for an example of the eye fixation transitions. We modeled our transitions from
an eye-tracking study by Arieli, Ben- Ami and Rubinstein (2009), in which they denote
horizontal eye movement as one that evaluates one attribute at a time and denotes a vertical
movement as one that evaluates one option at a time. Our analyses mainly focus on these two
types of eye movements.
Proportion of refixations. We calculated the proportion of fixations considered
refixations to an option. A refixation is looking back at an option that has already been fully
evaluated, after having already looked away at another option.
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Spatial location. We summed the total number of fixations for each spatial position.
For each trial type, we tested whether there were more fixations towards the center options of
the display versus options towards the outside.
Dynamics over trial. We also investigated how fixation patterns changed as a trial
progressed. Each trial was divided into tenths based on total number of fixations for that trial.
For each decile, we calculated the proportion of fixations on each attribute, and also
calculated proportions of each fixation transition. We then calculated subject specific linear
coefficients for the proportions of each attribute and each eye fixation transitions and then
tested whether each set of coefficients differ from zero.
Combined behavioral and eye-tracking analysis
Choice as a function of when an option is fully evaluated. We ordered options by the
sequence in which they were first fully evaluated. We then calculated for each position in the
order the percentage of times the option at that position in the order was ultimately chosen.
Choice as a function of amount within fully evaluated options. For each trial, we
ranked from largest to smallest the amounts of only those options that were fully evaluated.
We then calculated for each rank in the sequence the percentage of times the option at that
rank was ultimately chosen.
Results
People simplify by not fully evaluating all options as the number of options increases
Basic response time and eye-tracking measures suggest that subjects in both timing
conditions do not employ a fully compensatory strategy. If subjects employ a fully
compensatory strategy, continuing to evaluate every option to the same degree as the number
of options increases, we would expect to see a linear increase in response times with the
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number of options. In contrast to this, but consistent with previous work, response times
largely follow Hick’s Law (Hick, 1952), increasing linearly with the logarithm of the number
of options. Without time pressure, as the number of options increases, there is a significant
increase in response times (β = .82, p < .001). See Figure 3a. Similarly, when there is time
pressure, the average response times across subjects also increase linearly with the log of the
number of options (β = .96, p < .001). See Figure 3b. Without time pressure, there is also
evidence for a small but significant nonlinear quadratic trend (β = .20, p < .01), a departure
from Hick’s Law. There was no evidence for nonlinearity with time pressure (p = .80).
The overall number of fixations followed the same pattern as response times. The
mean number of fixations under both timing conditions increases linearly to the log of the
number of options (without time pressure: β = .83, p < .001; with time pressure: β = .96, p <
.001). See Figures 3c and 3d. Again, without time pressure, the increase in fixations is
nonlinear with a slight curvature, (β = .18, p < .001), but with time pressure, there is not
significant nonlinearity (p = .08).
Since response times and number of fixations do not increase in proportion to the
number of options, the evaluation time per option must decrease as the number of options
increases. We next test whether this led participants to skip evaluating some of the options
within the choice set. We define an option as fully evaluated if the participant looked at both
attributes of the option (i.e., looked at both amount and probability within an option). With
and without time pressure, participants fully evaluated a smaller percentage of the total
options as the number of options increased (without time pressure: β = -.90, p < .001; with
time pressure: β = -.93 p < .001). See Figures 3e and 3f. Finally, though these metrics are
affected in the same way by the number of options regardless of time pressure, subjects under
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time pressure respond faster, make fewer fixations, and evaluate a smaller percentage of total
options for all trial types (ps < .0001). The next three sections test what effect not fully
evaluating every option has on what people choose and what factors determine whether an
option is fully evaluated or not.
People are less successful at maximizing and slightly more risk averse as the number of
options increases
The previous analyses suggest that participants use a simplifying strategy in response
to an increasing number of options, rather than fully evaluating every option in the choice set
in a compensatory manner. The next set of analyses investigates whether this simplification
affects choice. The choice sets were designed so that one option, the “pop-out”, had a higher
expected utility than all of the other options within the choice set. In both timing conditions,
participants miss more pop-outs as the number of options increases (without time pressure: β
= -.87, p < .001; with time pressure: β = -.93 p < .001). During 16-option trials, subjects
under time pressure choose the pop-out fewer times compared to those without time pressure
(p < .01). There is no significant difference between timing conditions in other trial types.
See Figures 4a and 4b. Though fewer pop-outs are chosen as the number of options
increases, subjects select the pop-out at above chance levels in all conditions (ps < .001).
The pop-out option was defined a priori by the experimenter, and therefore may not
actually be the most subjectively valuable option to a given subject. This is especially true of
subjects who are either highly risk-averse or highly risk-seeking. Therefore, one possibility is
that subjects “miss” more pop-outs as the number of options increases because their degree
of risk aversion is changing. We fit an expected utility model to subjects’ choices separately
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for each condition (i.e., 2-option, 4-option, 8-option and 16-option) to see whether there are
changes in risk aversion as the number of options increases. In both timing conditions,
subjects become slightly more risk averse as the number of options increases (without time
pressure: β = -.10, p < .05; with time pressure: β = -.16, p < .05). See Figures 4c and 4d. Risk
aversion levels do not significantly differ between timing conditions.
We then determined the option with the highest subjective value for each subject,
given his or her own risk preferences for each of the trial types. When taking into
consideration risk preferences, subjects choose the option with the highest subjective value
less often as the number of options increases (without time pressure: β = -.82, p < .001; with
time pressure: β = -.86 p < .001). See Figure 4e and 4f. During 8-option and 16-option trials,
subjects under time pressure choose the option with the highest subjective value less often
than subjects without time pressure (p < .05). Thus, even though risk aversion increases
slightly as the number of options increases, this does not account for the increase in the
number of pop-out options missed. Subjects are less likely to select the most valuable option
as the size of the choice set increases.
People are not following a lexicographic non-compensatory strategy
The previous analyses suggest that participants only fully evaluate a subset of the
choice options as the size of the choice set increases, and that this leads their choices to be
less consistent with utility maximization. The next set of analyses aims to identify what
determines whether an option is fully evaluated and whether subjects are switching to a noncompensatory strategy. We first test whether subjects are switching to a simple lexicographic
strategy as the number of options increases. In our task, two such lexicographic strategies are
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possible: selecting the option with the highest probability to win or the highest payoff. If
subjects are using a lexicographic non-compensatory strategy, this could explain a decrease
in the number of options fully evaluated because for most options only the relevant attribute
is considered.
There are several pieces of evidence against the hypothesis that subjects switch to
strictly using a lexicographic strategy. First, as shown above, subjects’ degree of risk
aversion does not shift to extreme levels of risk seeking or risk aversion as would be
expected if they were solely choosing the highest probability or highest payoff options. This
is also evident in a direct test of people’s choices. We find that under both timing conditions
subjects choose the option with the highest probability fewer times as the number of options
increases (without time pressure: β = -.44, p < .0001; with time pressure: β = -.52 p < .0001),
and they also choose the option with the highest payoff fewer times as the number of options
increases (without time pressure: β = -.78, p < .0001; with time pressure: β = -.69 p < .0001).
See Figures 5a-5d. Subjects do choose the highest probability option at greater than chance
levels, however. Without time pressure, subjects choose the highest probability option at
above chance levels for 8- and 16-option trials (ps < .01), and under time pressure, subjects
choose the highest probability at above chance levels for 2-, 8-, and 16-option trials (ps <
.05). In contrast, without time pressure, subjects choose the highest payoff option at below
chance levels for 4- and 8-option trials, and under time pressure, subjects choose the highest
payoff at below chance levels for 2-, 4-, and 8-option trials. Finally, subjects’ eye
movements are not consistent with the use of an attribute-based heuristic. While there is a
reliable increase in proportion of fixations on probability as the number of options increases,
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the absolute size of this increase is small (without time pressure: β = .18, p < .05; with time
pressure: β = .10 p < .05). See Figures 5e and 5f.
We also considered two other, more specific, heuristics: 1) priority heuristic
(Brandstatter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig, 2006) and 2) minimax regret (Savage, 1951). In our
task, the priority heuristic reduces to choosing the option with highest payoff, and is therefore
ruled out above. Minimax regret does make unique predictions in our task; however, subjects
in both timing conditions choose the minimax regret option fewer times as the number of
options increases (without time pressure: β = -.81, p < .0001; with time pressure: β = -.79 p <
.001) and choose this option above chance for 2- and 8-option trials only (without time
pressure: ps < .01; time pressure: ps < .05).
In sum, participants in both timing conditions choose the option with the highest
probability more often than chance but less often in absolute terms as the number of options
increases. They look more at probability and are more risk averse as the number of options
increases, but not to an extent that would suggest an exclusive reliance on probability.
Although these facts are not consistent with strict use of a simple probability-based heuristic,
the increasing weight on probability needs to be explained by any proposed simplifying
strategy.
People are not satisficing
We then tested whether subjects employed a different non-compensatory strategy, a
satisificing strategy, as the decision increased in difficulty. Satisficing involves evaluating
options until reaching one that surpasses an acceptability threshold and then choosing that
option (Schwartz et al., 2002). We performed two tests to determine if subjects are
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employing a satisficing strategy. First, if subjects are fully evaluating options only until they
find one that is acceptable, we expect to see few, if any, refixations of an option. Contrary to
a satisficing strategy, in both timing conditions and under all trial types, about half of
fixations in a trial were refixations (mean percentage of refixations = .43 to .73). Second, if
participants select the first option they find that is acceptable, we expect the majority of
selections to correspond to the last option that was fully evaluated. To test this, we ordered
the items by the sequence in which they were fully evaluated (i.e., a fixation had been made
to both attributes of the item), from the last item that was fully evaluated to the first, and
calculated the fraction of options at each position in the sequence that were ultimately
chosen. We compared this to a null distribution representing choosing randomly without an
effect of order of evaluation. Inconsistent with a satisficing strategy, subjects are not more
likely to choose the last option that was fully evaluated, and order of evaluation did not have
a significant effect on choice. Subjects usually did not choose the last option that was fully
evaluated at a level that differed from chance, and when they did, they actually chose this
option at significantly below chance levels (without time pressure 4-and 8-options: ps <.05;
all others: ps = ns). See Figures 6a-6f.
People simplify the choice set based on attribute values and spatial location
If people are not adopting a simple non-compensatory lexicographic strategy or
satisficing strategy as the choice set size increases, what criterion explains which options are
fully evaluated and which are not? We next test two different strategies that subjects might
use for reducing the number of options that need to be fully evaluated: spatial and attributebased. With a spatial reduction strategy, subjects further evaluate a subset of options based
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on their spatial locations. Finally, an attribute-based reduction strategy involves further
evaluating only those options where one attribute passes a set threshold.
We next tested whether spatial location influences the options that are fully evaluated.
Figures 7a-7f show the distribution of options fully evaluated in each condition, by location,
in a gray-scale “heat map”. Subjects tend to fully evaluate options in the center of the screen
compared to options on the outside, in both timing conditions and in all set sizes (p < .0001).
Additionally, subjects in both timing conditions also choose options in the center more often
than the outside (ps <. 0001). Thus, spatial location does play a role in determining what
options subjects fully evaluate.
We then examined whether the amount and probability of each option influence
whether or not that option is fully evaluated. Without time pressure, both the amount and
probability of the option predict whether the option is fully evaluated, but probability (β =
.85, p < .0001) is a stronger predictor than amount (β = .58, p < .0001). The same pattern
emerges when under time pressure, where probability (β = .73, p < .0001) is a stronger
predictor than amount (β = .40, p < .0001). See Figure 8a-8d for partial regression plots to
see how each attribute uniquely affects the number of subjects who fully evaluated a
particular option. These data suggest that participants also use an attribute-based strategy,
fully evaluating those options where one attribute is high.
Dynamics over time: People initially scan probabilities
The previous analyses demonstrate that people simplify the choice set based on
attribute levels, and especially probability. That is, options with low probability are less
likely to be fully evaluated, whereas options with high probability are more likely to be fully
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evaluated. We now test whether subjects use an EBA strategy or whether subjects use a
combination strategy that involves reducing based on an attribute, initially like an EBA
strategy, but then switching to a compensatory strategy to make a decision. In order to test
these strategies, we explore the dynamics of this simplification process by examining how
eye fixations and fixation transitions change across the course of a trial.
First, we examine how the proportion of fixations on probability versus amount
changes as a trial progresses. Across all trial types in both timing conditions, subjects
initially have a greater proportion of fixations on probability, and the proportion of fixations
on probability decreases as the trial progresses (without time pressure: ps < .05, median βs =
-.007 to -.013; time pressure: ps < .05, median βs = -.008 to -.018). See Figures 9a-9h.
Next, we analyze how eye fixation sequences change throughout a trial. We
categorize fixation transitions based on whether the current fixation is on either probability or
amount and whether the next fixation will be on 1) the same attribute but in a different option
(attribute-based eye movements) or 2) a different attribute within the same option (optionbased eye movements). Without time pressure, during 4-, 8-, and 16-option trials, subjects
employ fewer attribute-based eye movements across probabilities as a trial progresses
(median βs = -.013 to -.018, ps < .0001). Similarly, with time pressure, the employment of
attribute-based eye movements across probabilities decreases throughout a trial (all trials:
median βs = -.009 to -.022, ps < .01). Thus, in both timing conditions, subjects are more
likely to fixate probabilities, and more likely to scan between probabilities in different
options, early in the trial.
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Dynamics over time: People then fully evaluate a subset of options (without time
pressure) or scan amounts (with time pressure)
Other aspects of the fixation transitions differ depending on whether subjects are
under time pressure or not. Subjects without time pressure switch to a compensatory strategy
and employ a greater number of alternative-based eye movements as a trial progresses during
8- and 16-option trials (median βs = .004 and .002, ps < .05), while subjects under time
pressure do not show this pattern. In contrast, for all trial types, subjects under time pressure
continue to use a non-compensatory strategy and employ a greater number of attribute-based
eye movements across amounts as a trial progresses (median βs = .007 to .017, ps < .01).
Subjects without time pressure also employ this attribute-based pattern, but only for 2- and 4option trials (median βs = .01 & .007, ps < .05). See Figures 10a-10h. Thus, subjects without
time pressure tend to increasingly rely on alternative-based eye movements as the trial
progresses, switching from scanning probabilities to evaluating alternatives. In contrast,
subjects under time pressure tend to increasingly scan across amounts as the trial progresses,
switching from scanning probabilities to scanning amounts.
Do subject’s choices reflect these eye fixation movement dynamics? To answer this
question, we look at which option, of the options fully evaluated, subjects choose for 4-, 8-,
and 16-option trials. Subjects without time pressure do not choose the option with the highest
amount (amongst those options that are fully evaluated) most often. Instead, subjects are
most likely to choose the third highest amount. In contrast, subjects under time pressure
choose the option with the highest amount (amongst those options that are fully evaluated)
the most. See Figures 11a-11f. Consistent with eye-tracking data, subjects’ choices suggests
that subjects without time pressure tend to employ a combination non-compensatory and
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compensatory strategy by reducing the choice set based on the attributes and then tend to
choose in a compensatory manner amongst the options that are fully evaluated. In contrast,
subjects under time pressure are more likely to use a non-compensatory EBA strategy,
especially as the number of options increases, by first reducing the choice set based on
probabilities and then select the remaining option with the highest payoff.
Discussion
In this present investigation, we sought to identify the type of simplifying strategies
people employ in the face of increased decision difficulty and systematically examine the
computational complexity-accuracy tradeoff in decision strategy selection. Consistent with
our hypothesis, for both timing conditions, subjects do not employ a fully compensatory
strategy. Instead, in both timing conditions, subjects simplify by fully evaluating a smaller
percentage of options as the number of options increases, where fully evaluating involves
fixating on both amounts and probabilities of the option. Additionally, in both conditions,
subject are more likely to fully evaluate options with higher probabilities suggesting subjects
reduce the option sets based on probabilities.
However, subjects in the different timing conditions diverge in how they make their
decisions after reducing the choice set. Subjects without time pressure tend to use a
combination strategy where they fully evaluate the remaining subset of options, as evidenced
by greater employment of alternative-based eye-movements. In contrast, subjects under time
pressure and facing more extreme levels of difficulty tend to continue to use a noncompensatory strategy by scanning across the amounts of the remaining subset of options.
Furthermore, these same subjects are then more likely to select the remaining option with the
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highest payoff, which is not the case for subjects without time pressure. Thus, subjects
without time pressure tend to employ a compensatory strategy to make a decision after
reducing the option set while subjects under time pressure tend towards a similar but simpler
strategy, elimination-by-aspects, and continue to focus on a single attribute at a time to make
a decision. These results are consistent with our hypothesis and the adaptive decision maker
framework, where strategy selection in response to incremental increases in difficulty
changes in a gradual rather than categorical manner. More specifically, subjects tend to use a
mixed compensatory and non-compensatory strategy in response to increases in the number
of options, but then shift a simpler non-compensatory strategy when the decision increases
even more with time pressure.
Surprisingly, previous research does not completely capture our findings, and the half
dozen strategies previously noted do not appear to fully explain the simplifying strategies
employed during our task. In our investigation, we do not find evidence for switching to a
simplistic heuristic or satisficing strategy as difficulty increases. Although subjects appear to
show a stronger preference for probabilities as the number of options increases, the increase
is slight and much less than what we would expect to see if a subject bases their decisions
primarily on one attribute. Contradictory to a satisficing strategy, subjects tend not to choose
the last option that was fully evaluated, and order of evaluation does not have a significant
effect on choice. However, we find evidence that subjects reduce the number of options for
further evaluation. In addition, both spatial location and attribute levels influence which
options are fully evaluated, suggesting that reduction is not random.
Our study finds evidence that a person’s response to increasing difficulty is adaptive
in two ways. First, our subjects adapt to difficulty by using the available information. This
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study does not have a simple or default option available for subjects to choose when facing
increasing difficulty. Instead, subjects adapt to increasing difficulty by relying on attribute
levels and spatial information to simplify the decision. Second, we find that subjects adapt to
increasing difficulty by gradually changing their strategy as opposed to more categorical
shifts in strategies. In other words, both groups of subjects employ simplifying strategies, but
the group experiencing time pressure adapted to the increase in difficulty by employing a
simpler strategy that requires less cognitive effort. This finding is consistent with the
adaptive decision maker framework where individuals can shift across strategies at various
gradations along the accuracy-effort tradeoff.
We find that, although subjects do use both probability and amount information in
reducing the choice set, they rely more heavily on probability. This reliance on probability is
likely adaptive given that subjects are risk-averse, and therefore weight probabilities slightly
more than amounts. We would predict, then, that subjects would focus on the most heavily
weighted attribute first in other kinds multi-attribute decisions. In our study, we find that
subjects’ decisions are ultimately made using both attributes, whether with an attribute-based
reduction or elimination-by-aspects strategy. Again, we think this is likely adaptive, since
subjects place weight on both probabilities and amounts. In other kinds of multi-attribute
decisions, though, attribute weights may be less balanced and subjects might collapse to
attribute-based heuristic more readily. Future research should test how strategy selection
depends on initial preferences in a more detailed fashion.
Our evidence for the adaptive decision maker framework hinges on extracting more
detailed information from eye-tracking measures. One of our critical eye-tracking measures
is whether an option is “fully evaluated”, which involves evaluating fixations to multiple
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ROIs jointly. We also combine behavioral and eye-tracking measures to create richer metrics
that allow us to examine specific aspects of decision-making strategies. By combining eyetracking and choice measures, we are also able to rule out satisficing as a strategy. By
combining eye-tracking and choice measures and by examining eye fixation patterns over
time, we are able to distinguish elimination-by-aspects from an attribute-reduction strategy.
Our results provide proof of principle that more quantitative tests of the computational
complexity-accuracy tradeoff hypothesis are both possible with eye-tracking measures and
merited given our results. This framework can provide rich predictions in a variety of
different choice domains and for a variety different effort manipulations, and our results hold
promise that such detailed predictions could be testable with eye-tracking techniques.
Future research also needs to examine how well our findings generalize to less wellcontrolled settings. The laboratory environment allows us to isolate and control all variables
of interest and make very precise eye movement measurements, but a laboratory setting may
not be representative of the kinds of environments in which people typically make decisions.
If our analysis techniques can be paired with advances in mobile eye-tracking technology
(Boening et al., 2006; Bulling and Gellersen, 2010), future studies could investigate how well
our findings generalize to a wider variety of decision-making settings. For instance, future
studies could examine decisions that involve many options in stores, restaurants, car
dealerships, or other business settings.
The current study suggests that when presented with many options, people initially
reduce the number of options based on probability. Subjects without time pressure then tend
to employ a compensatory strategy by fully evaluating the remaining options, while those
under time pressure and facing more difficulty tend to employ a similar but simpler attribute61"
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based strategy, elimination-by-aspects. Our methods for analyzing eye-tracking data move
beyond previous studies and make it possible to identify and distinguish the subtleties in
decision strategies. Additionally, by varying the difficulty of the task more incrementally and
collecting finer-grained process measures, we are able to detect that subjects simplify in a
more gradual manner and that decision strategy selection may be more graded and less
categorical than often portrayed. Previous studies have proposed many different strategies in
response to increasing number of options and increasing difficulty. Our findings provide
empirical support that strategy selection is based on an effort-accuracy framework, where
different strategies reflect different points on the computational complexity-accuracy tradeoff
as originally proposed by the Adaptive Decision Maker.
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Figure 1. Example of each trial type. (A) 2-option trial (B) 4-option trial (C) 8-option trial
(D) 16-option trial
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Figure 2. Illustration of fixation transitions. The blue lines denote within-option fixation
transitions where subjects looked at a different attribute within the same option as the next
fixation. The red and green lines denote within-attribute fixation transitions, where red lines
denotes scanning over probabilities and green lines denotes scanning amounts. Gray lines are
considered transitional fixation transitions where subjects looked at a different attribute in a
different option as their next fixation.
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Figure 8. Partial correlation plots to see unique effects of each attribute (A) Options with
higher probability are more likely to be fully evaluated after controlling for amount of the
options (without time pressure). (B) Options with higher probability are more likely to be
fully evaluated after controlling for amount of the options (with time pressure). (C) Options
with higher amounts are more likely to be fully evaluated after controlling for probability of
the options but to a lesser degree (without time pressure). (D) Options with higher amounts
are more likely to be fully evaluated after controlling for probability of the options but to a
lesser degree (with time pressure).
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CHAPTER 4 – Evidence for distinct neural representations in frontal and parietal cortices for
different sources of decision difficulty.
Introduction
A remarkable feature of human cognition is the ability to adapt to the ever-changing
demands of the environment. How these cognitive demands are represented in the brain has
been of great interest to researchers. Previous studies have found several common brain
regions in frontal and parietal cortices responding to many different forms of cognitive
demand including working memory tasks (Owen, 1997; Rypma et al., 1999; Derfuss, Brass,
and von Cramon, 2004), response inhibition (Barch et al., 2001; MacLeod and MacDonald,
2000, Braver, et al., 2001; Durston et al., 2002), perceptual difficulty (Grady et al., 1996;
Barch et al., 1997; Koechlin, 1999), and decision difficulty (Botvinick, 2007; Ponchon et al.,
2008; Shenhav et al., 2014). Additionally, meta-analytic work of functional neuroimaging
studies of different cognitive demands found activation across the dorsolateral surfaces of the
frontal lobe, mid-ventrolateral and anterior cingulate regions, and in and around the
intraparietal sulcus (Duncan and Owen, 2000). This network of regions, coined the multipledemand or MD system, has been found to respond to a broad range of different cognitive
tasks regardless of the specific demands.
Although similar regions are implicated to be more active during demanding tasks,
previous studies have typically used a single manipulation of cognitive demand making it
difficult to single out a common neural network across different demands. Moreover, these
studies have relied on traditional group analysis and meta-analyses of activation peaks pooled
across studies, which can overestimate overlap due to neuroanatomical variability across
subjects. This can result in overlapping activations across different tasks even when these
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tasks activate non-overlapping brain regions in each subject (Saxe, Brett, and Kanwisher,
2006; Fedorenko et al., 2010). More recent work by Fedorenko et al. (2013) addressed these
limitations by testing the engagement of the multiple demand system across different tasks.
By defining regions of interest (ROIs) in individual subjects, the authors found overlapping
activation on the individual subject level across the MD system for a number of different
demanding tasks. To date, this is the most compelling evidence for a common domain
general network for responding to cognitive demands.
Despite the evidence for overlapping fMRI activity on an individual subject level
across these regions, it is not clear whether these different demanding tasks engage these
frontal and parietal regions in the same way. In other words, do these regions actually have
common patterns of activation across the different demanding tasks? The subject-specific
ROI approach involves averaging across voxels to extract single measures of overall level of
activity in a region. This method and traditional univariate group analyses test questions
regarding where functions are performed or where the activation occurred, while analyses
investigating the pattern of voxel activity can answer the question of how information is
neurally represented or how the neural region is engaged (Haxby, 2012). Thus, even if the
fMRI activity evoked by the different tasks are overlapping in specific regions, these tasks
can still have distinct patterns of voxel activity. Notably, a recent study by Woo and
colleagues (2014) found distinct neural patterns of activity for social and physical pain by
using multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA; Haxby et al., 2001) even though these types of
pains have overlapping fMRI activity (Kross et al., 2011).
Here, we build on previous studies to test the question of whether different forms of
cognitive demand share common neural representation or whether these different demands
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have distinct neural representation across the multiple demand system. We use decisionmaking to test this question because previous studies have established the many ways in
which decisions can be made more demanding and complex, such as increasing the number
of options, increasing time constraints, or changing the format of the decision context (see
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1993). Further, previous research has also demonstrated the
ability of individuals to adapt to different decision demands by employing cognitive
flexibility (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1993).
In this investigation, we use one type of decision-making task, intertemporal choice
task, and manipulate the task in four different ways to induce increases in difficulty. Each
manipulation has an easier control condition that is the same across all manipulations. We
chose this task design so that we only changed the actual demand that was involved, but the
actual evaluative judgment remained the same. Notably, if the different conditions have
distinct neural representation even though the underlying task is the same, it would provide
stronger evidence against commonality. During the experiment, subjects provided their
subjective ratings of how difficult they thought their decisions were, which served as a
manipulation check to test whether our difficult tasks were in fact more difficult. Using both
group-level and individual-level analyses, we found widespread activation in the frontal and
parietal cortices of the multiple demand system, which is consistent with previous results.
When we ran analyses on a voxel level and investigated the pattern of activation, we found
some evidence for shared representation across the different manipulations. But, more
importantly, we also found evidence for distinct patterns of activity across our different
manipulations throughout the MD system, which provides evidence against the view that the
multiple demand system as a general signal of demand across different tasks.
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Material and Methods
Subjects. Twenty-one healthy subjects with normal or corrected-to-normal vision
were recruited from the University of Pennsylvania community. All subjects were
compensated for their time on both testing days and received an additional monetary
payment based on their decisions in the tasks on both testing days. All participants provided
consent in accordance with the procedure approved by the University of Pennsylvania
institutional review board. Two subjects were excluded due to technical issues with their
anatomical images. This left us with 19 subjects whose functional data were analyzed (53%
females; mean age = 23.2).
Tasks. All participants completed two sessions, separated by an average of 7 ± 2 days.
Both sessions involved a monetary delay discounting task, where participants made a series
of decisions between a smaller amount of money available now and a larger amount of
money available after a delay (e.g., $10 now vs. $34 in 30 days). We chose this task because
neural activity in this task has been well characterized in previous studies (Kable and
Glimcher, 2007; Kable and Glimcher, 2010; Senecal et al., 2012; Cooper and Kable, 2015).
The first session took approximately 30 minutes, while the second session took
approximately one hour. At the end of each session, one trial was randomly selected and the
participant was paid via debit card according to one of their choices (Kable and Glimcher,
2007).
The first session served as a behavioral screening task in order to estimate each
subject’s discount rate, a measure of how much the subject devalues or discounts rewards to
be received in the future. This estimate was then used to tailor the experimental task in the
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second session according to each subject’s discount rate. In the first session, the discounting
task involved 102 choices. The range of monetary values for the immediate reward varied
from $10-$34, and amounts for the larger reward were $25, $30, or $35. Delays ranged from
1- 180 days. All subjects saw the same choices, but the choices were presented in a different
random order for each subject. Subjects had 6 seconds to make a choice between two
options. After a choice was made, a feedback screen was displayed for 1 second denoting a
checkmark for the chosen option.
In the second session, subjects made 256 choices during an fMRI session. The
monetary values for the immediate reward ranged from $5 to $36. The amounts for the
delayed reward ranged from $6 to $80 and the delays ranged from 1 – 180 days. The
experimental task involved four different manipulations inducing increased difficulty: (1)
disfluency (words instead of numbers and varying delay units instead of consistent delay
units); (2) multioption (4 options instead of 2); (3) time pressure (respond in 1.5 s instead of
6 s), (4) subjective value difference at or around 0 (choices near indifference instead of far
from indifference). See Figure 1a for an example of each manipulation. Since RTs typically
increase as choices become more demanding (Wilcox, 1993; Yeung and Monsell, 2003) it is
often difficult to dissociate increases in demand from time on task. We included time
pressure as a manipulation to dissociate time on task from demand. For all trials except for
when the value difference was near indifference, the difference in subjective value between
the two options in a trial ranged from $5 to $15. Additionally, in all but time pressure trials,
subjects had 6 seconds to respond. Once a subject responded a red box outlined the chosen
option for 0.5 seconds. Then, a 1.5 second blank intertrial interval (ITI) screen was presented
to the subject. If subjects submitted before 6 seconds, the ITI absorbed the remaining time
78"
"

making the blank ITI screen longer. For time pressure trials, the ITI was longer (6 seconds)
to compensate for the shorter trial periods. If subjects submitted their response before 1.5
seconds, the ITI still absorbed the remaining time. This ensured equal number of trials across
manipulations and ensured that block lengths were equal across the whole experiment. It also
discouraged subjects from responding rapidly in an attempt to complete the task quickly.
Each of the four manipulations was compared to an easy control task. The easy control task
was the same for all four conditions, which included two options that were far apart in
subjective value and presented numerically to increase fluency.
We used a block design for our fMRI experimental session, and the experimental task
consisted of eight scan runs. Each scan run was divided into four hard blocks and four easy
blocks, and the easy and hard blocks alternated within each scan run. Each scan run included
only one manipulation of difficulty, and each difficulty manipulation was conducted in two
scan runs. By having two scan runs of each manipulation, we were able to compare the
pattern of neural activity for within manipulations (e.g., disfluency scan run 1 vs. disfluency
scan run 2) and the pattern of activity between manipulations (e.g., disfluency scan run 1 vs.
multioption scan run1). Additionally, the order of easy and hard blocks was counterbalanced
across runs, and the order of the difficult manipulations was counterbalanced across subjects.
After each block, subjects were asked “How difficult did you find the last set of decisions?”
Subjects moved a cursor along a line that went from “not difficult at all” to “very difficult” to
submit their answers. See Figure 1b for an illustration. Each subject was told to use the same
scaling across the whole experiment.
Behavioral Data Analysis. We estimated discount rates using optimization routines
implemented in Matlab (Mathworks). Discount rates in this experiment were calculated
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assuming a hyperbolic discounting model, SV = A/(1 + kD), where SV denotes an option’s
estimated subjective value, A and D represent the option amount and delay, and k represents
the individual’s estimated discount rate (Mazur, 1987). K values across subjects ranged from
.005 to .16 with the median k = .02. On average, 92 ± .7% of choices were consistent with
the estimated discount rates. The distribution of k values is consistent with other studies (e.g.,
Senecal et al., 2013; Cooper and Kable, 2015).
Our fMRI analyses assumed that each manipulation was more difficult than the
control trials. To check for a possible violation of this assumption, we used the subjective
ratings of difficulty to test whether each manipulation was considered more difficult than its
respective easy control blocks. We averaged each subject’s subjective ratings of difficulty for
each manipulation and for each of the corresponding easy control blocks, and then compared
the subjective ratings of each manipulation to its easy control.
Additionally, we compared median response times (RTs) between the hard and easy
blocks for each manipulation. Response times were calculated as the duration from onset of
trials to the submission of choice.
fMRI Data Acquisition and Preprocessing. Anatomical and functional brain images
were acquired using a 3T Siemens Trio MRI scanner with a 32-channel head coil. Each
session began with the acquisition of a high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical image
(MPRAGE sequence; TR = 1630 ms; TE = 3.11 ms; TI = 1100ms; flip angle, 15o; 160 axial
slices; voxel size, 0.9375x0.9375x1.000MM; matrix, 192x256) and a T2-weighted
anatomical image (TR = 7000 ms; TE = 90.0ms; flip angle, 180o; 44 axial slices; voxel slices,
0.75x0.75x3.0mm; matrix 256x256). Functional images were collected at TR = 2.5s, TE =
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30ms, 45 axial slices in interleaved order, and 3x3x3mm voxels. To reduce signal dropout in
orbitofrontal cortex, we used a slice angle 30 degrees to the place of the anterior and
posterior commissures (Deichmann et al., 2003). The resulting slice prescription provided
whole or near-whole brain coverage across participants.
Pre-processing and data analysis for individual subjects were performed using
FMRIB Software Library (FSL; Jenkinson et al. 2012; Woolrich et al., 2009; Smith et al.,
2004). Functional images were corrected for differences in slice time acquisition and then deobliqued to correct for the 30 degree tilt slice acquisition. Data were then motion corrected
by spatially realigning each image with the central image in the run. Motion-corrected
functional data were co-registered to the participant’s anatomy and to the MNI template,
which included alignment to the T2-weighted anatomical image, alignment to the highresolution MPRAGE image, and then nonlinear warping to the MNI template (Jenkinson,
2002). Non-brain matter was removed from the anatomical images prior to registration
(Smith, 2002). Warped images were spatially smoothed using a Guassian kernel of FWHM
5mm.
Whole brain analysis. Each participant’s functional data were modeled following a
block design analysis using a general linear model (GLM). The GLM tested for regions
activating for the hard > easy contrast for each of the 4 manipulations. The GLM for each
manipulation included two regressors: (1) block period of decisions not including the rating
period (total of 4 trials + ITIs = 28 s), and (2) whether the block was our experimental hard
block (denoted by 1). The subject level contrasts were then combined into a higher-level
group analysis using FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects (FLAME). FLAME uses
sophisticated methods for modeling inter-subject random-effects component of the mixed81"
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effects variance by using MCMC (Markov Chain Monte Carlo randomization) to calculate an
accurate estimation of the true random effects and degrees of freedom at each voxel. Z
statistic images were thresholded at z > 2.3 and cluster corrected at p < .05 (Worsley, et al.,
1992). We overlayed the four hard > easy contrasts maps to look for overlapping areas across
the four conditions. To find unique activation for disfluency, we first combined the hard >
easy contrast maps for the other three manipulations. We then subtracted the combined hard
> easy contrast map from the disfluency hard > easy contrast map, which left us with a map
showing regions that were only recruited for disfluency. We then did this for the other three
manipulations.
Functional Region of Interests analysis. For the individual-subject functional ROI
(fROI) analyses, we adapted the procedure set forth by Federenko et al. (2013). Each scan
run’s hard > easy contrast served as an independent localizer contrast (thresholded at p <
.05, uncorrected), resulting in two different localizers for each contrast. Having two
independent localizers for each manipulation allowed us to compare fMRI activity within
each manipulation (e.g., disfluency activity in one scan run was estimated from an fROI
defined by the disfluency manipulation from another scan run) and activity between
manipulation (e.g., disfluency activity in one scan run was estimated from an fROI defined
by the multioption manipulation from another scan run). We also used previously reported
anatomical ROI masks of the multiple-demand system (See Figure 2; Duncan and Owen,
2000; see Fedorenko et al., 2013).
To define fROIs, we intersected each of the 9 anatomical ROIs with each of the 8
subject specific localizer contrasts. Therefore, each subject had a set of 72 fROIs created
from the anatomical ROIs and his/her own activation maps. It is important to note that each
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localizer used for fROI definition was independent from the data used to estimate the effects.
Thus, each fROI served as an ROI for 7 of 8 scan runs. We then extracted average parameter
estimates, converted to % change signal, from each individual fROI. To estimate the
responses of these fROIs to various manipulations, we averaged the between-manipulation
values across subjects for each manipulation and also averaged the within-manipulation
values across subjects for each manipulation. We ran a manipulation (4 factors) by between
or within (2 factors) repeated measures ANOVA to test for an overall effect for each region
and for any differential effects by the manipulations. Additionally, we ran t-tests to see which
conditions had significant effects against 0 in each region.
Multi-voxel pattern similarity analysis. To test whether the different types of
decisions have distinct neural representation, we investigated whether the patterns of activity
between the same manipulation are significantly more similar that the patterns of activity
between different manipulations. Correlations between patterns of activity of scan runs
served as measures of similarity (Haxby, 2001). We used the anatomical ROIs to extract
individual voxel parameter estimates for each scan run’s hard > easy contrast. Our design
includes two runs of each manipulation allowing us to calculate within-manipulation pattern
correlations and between-manipulation correlations. We ran correlations for the 4 withinmanipulation pairs and every possible pair of between-manipulations (total of 24 pairwise
correlations). We averaged the between-manipulation correlations and the withinmanipulation correlations for each subject. We then tested whether both within- and
between-manipulations correlations were significantly different from zero across each region,
and then ran paired t-tests to test for differences between the two averages for each region.
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Searchlight analysis. Although our focus was on predefined ROIs, we also performed
exploratory whole-brain analysis to determine whether areas outside of our ROIs showed
distinct neural representation across our manipulations. For the whole-brain version of
MVPA, we implemented a searchlight analysis (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006). Specifically, we
defined a small spherical ROI (radius = 3mm) centered on each voxel. In each spherical ROI,
we computed the similarities between manipulations and within manipulations, similar to the
previous analyses described, which results in each voxel having a similarity measure or
correlation for the sphere of voxels surrounding that voxel. To run our searchlight, we
adapted script from the CoSMoMVPA Toolbox (www.cosmomvpa.org, Oosterhof and
Connolly, 2014). For each subject, we ended up with two brain maps of voxel-by-voxel
average correlation coefficients of the within-manipulation comparisons and of the betweenmanipulation comparisons. We then ran separate group statistics by running a voxel-by-voxel
t-test against 0 for each group of maps. We corrected for multiple comparisons by using the
false discovery rate (FDR) method (Yekutieli and Benjamini, 1999), as implemented in the
FSL software. To look for areas that distinguish the different manipulations, we looked for
areas that had greater similarity for the within-manipulation patterns compared to the
between-manipulation patterns. For each subject, we created a brain map of the differences
between the within-manipulation correlations and the between-manipulation correlations
(i.e., within-manipulation minus between-manipulation). We then ran a group statistic over
these maps by running a voxel-by-voxel t-test against 0 and corrected for multiple
comparisons using FDR.
Results
Behavioral Results
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Manipulation check. As our fMRI analyses assumed, each of the hard manipulations
was rated subjectively more difficult than its respective easy controls. For each of the four
manipulations, the hard blocks were rated significantly more difficult than the easy control
blocks. (ps < .05). See Figure 3a.
Additionally, as expected, for each manipulation except for time pressure, subjects
spent significantly more time on hard trials compared to control trials (ps < .01). Further,
subjects also spent significantly less time during time pressure trials than the control trials (p
< .01). See Figure 3b. This finding, in conjunction with our results from our subjective
ratings, provides evidence that response times were dissociated from the subjective feeling of
difficulty. Our subjects viewed our time pressure trials as more difficult, but spent less time
on these trials.
Group-level fMRI analysis
The first goal of the fMRI analysis was to identify regions that were activated by the
difficult manipulations. Consistent with previous findings, traditional group analyses
revealed activity in frontal and parietal areas for the hard > easy contrasts across the four
tasks. In particular, we see activation in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), dorsal
anterior cingulate (dACC), dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), supplementary motor
areas (SMA), insula and both the inferior and superior parietal cortex. We then overlayed the
manipulation specific hard > easy contrasts maps to look for areas of overlap. We found
overlap in dmPFC and parietal areas in at least 3 of the manipulations, which could
potentially be areas serving as general demand regions. Interestingly, we did not find any
overlapping areas for all 4 manipulations. See Figure 4a. Finally, we looked for regions that
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only uniquely activated for each manipulation. We found unique activation in middle and
inferior frontal gyrus for disfluency, unique activation in visual cortex for multioption, and
unique activation in ventrolateral frontal cortex for time pressure. See Figure 4b.
Functional ROI results
Next, we examined whether activation for different tasks overlap at the individual
subject level. Figure 5 shows the response profiles of the manipulations across each of
regions of the multiple-demand system. We found an overall significant effect for all of the
regions (ps < .05). We also found an differential effect by condition in three areas, the
opercular part of IFG (F = 4.62, p < .01), insula (F = 3.20, p < .05), and inferior parietal
cortex (F =2.82), p < .05). Additionally, we found a differential effect by whether the fROI
was defined by the same or different manipulation in the opercular part of IFG (F =16.18, p
< .01), where the estimates from fROIs defined by a different manipulation showed greater
activation.
When we tested the significance of the effect against 0 for each manipulation in each
region, we found that most of the regions show reliable hard > easy effects for at least 3 of
the 4 tasks. See Table 1. However, across all regions, the results are less reliable for the hard
> easy within task effects compared to the between task effects. This could be due to the fact
that there are fewer data points for the within-manipulation estimates. The regions that show
reliable hard > easy effects include the opercular part of IFG, insula, middle frontal gyrus
(MFG), orbital part of middle frontal gyrus (MFGorb), the inferior and superior parietal
cortices, precentral gyrus. Interestingly, anterior cingulate cortex show weaker results with
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fewer significant hard > easy effects, which is consistent with findings from Fedorenko et al.
(2013).
Multi-voxel similarity pattern analysis
Consistent with previous work, our results, thus far, suggest that several common
regions in the frontal and parietal cortices are active across different difficult tasks on both
the group level and individual level. Our next set of analyses test whether our manipulations
have distinct patterns of activation, specifically in the multiple demand system. As shown in
Figure 6, we found significant similarities in the patterns of activity across all of our
manipulations. For all regions, the between- and within- correlations were significantly
different from zero (ps < .05; mean within-correlations range from r = .20 to .32; mean
between-correlations range from r = .08 to .22). Interestingly, for all regions but ACC, the
within-manipulation correlations were significantly greater than the between-manipulation
correlations (ps < .05). For ACC, the within-manipulation correlations were marginally
greater than the between-manipulation correlations (p = .09). This suggests that although
there is some similarity in the neural patterns across our manipulations, our manipulations
also have distinct patterns of activity throughout the MD system.
Searchlight analysis
Our analyses thus far have focused mainly on a priori areas that have been implicated
by previous studies. To determine whether any regions outside of our predefined ROIs
showed distinct neural patterns across our manipulations, we performed a searchlight
analysis, in which we do the same analysis as above for small ROIs centered on each voxel in
the brain. Overall, our searchlight analysis corroborates our findings in our previous analyses
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(See Figure 7). We found significant similarities in the pattern of activity between different
manipulations across the whole brain. Similarly, we also found significant similarities in the
pattern of activity between the same manipulations across the whole brain, but these
similarities were greater than the similarities between different manipulations. Consistent
with our previous MVPA results, we also observed widespread areas that had greater
similarity for the within-manipulation patterns compared to the between-manipulation
patterns suggesting that these areas can distinguish the patterns of activity for the different
manipulations. Most notably, the areas that distinguish the different manipulations include
the frontal and parietal regions, which are some of the central components of the MD system.
Discussion
In this investigation, we extended work on cognitive demand and the multiple
demand system to investigate whether different forms of cognitive demand have distinct or
common neural representation. We used a single decision making task, the delay discounting
task, and manipulated this task in four ways to induce different forms of demand. Consistent
with previous studies, our group-level analysis and individual-level analysis (fROI) found
widespread activation in parietal and frontal cortices, areas considered as part of the
“multiple-demand” system (Duncan and Owen, 2000; Fedorenko et al., 2013). Critically,
using multi-voxel pattern analysis, we found that even though there are overlapping areas of
activation across our manipulations, we also found evidence for distinct neural representation
for our different manipulations. This finding was corroborated by our whole brain searchlight
analysis investigating similarity among patterns of activity.
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Findings from previous studies have suggested a general demand network, the MD
system, across the frontal and parietal cortices to be involved with many different forms of
demanding tasks (Duncan and Owen, 2000; Duncan, 2010; Fedorenko et al., 2013). We see
two possible interpretations of these previous findings on the MD system. The first
interpretation is that the MD system may serve as a unitary system serving as a signal for
detecting effort or the demands of the task. In other words, the MD system serves as a
general index of demand. The other interpretation is that the MD system is a shared network
of regions that are commonly recruited across many different tasks, but the way in which the
network is engaged depends on the task. Our results support the latter interpretation of the
MD system. We found that our different manipulations recruit similar regions in MD system
and share some commonality in the patterns of activity. But, we also found that our
manipulations have distinct patterns of activity and engage the MD system in different ways.
Our study also builds on previous work in several other ways. First, we used a withinsubject design, where each subject saw multiple manipulations within one session. Most
studies investigating cognitive demand have only used one manipulation of demand. By
using multiple manipulations within a subject, we were able to conduct more fine-grained
analyses, like subject-specific fROIs and MVPA. This is critical in investigating whether
multiple demands share common neural representations. Second, we collected subjective
ratings of difficulty during the experimental session. This allowed us to check whether our
manipulations were in fact more demanding to the subject as opposed to assuming our
manipulations were more difficult. Third, one of our manipulations, time pressure,
dissociated demand from RTs. This is critical because RTs typically increase as tasks become
more difficult and are often considered confounds for cognitive demand (Wilicox, 1993;
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Yeung and Monsell, 2003). It is often difficult to dissociate whether brain regions are
encoding the response to demand, or are just simply registering the time on task. In our case,
we successfully dissociated time on task from subjective difficulty because subjects rated
time pressure trials as more difficult but spent significantly less time on these trials.
Our results also have important implications for furthering our understanding of
human decision making. Much work has identified that decisions and preferences are highly
sensitive to the circumstances of the decision task, particularly to the demands of the task
(see Payne, Johnson, and Bettman, 1993). Yet, less work has focused on identifying the
actual decision strategies used and teasing apart why individuals use certain decision
strategies. A prominent view of strategy selection involves making tradeoffs between how
much effort an individual wants to put forth and the individual’s desire to make a good
decision (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1993). Although this accuracy-effort tradeoff
framework, along with other variations of this framework, has been proposed for decades,
very little has been done to test the assumptions of this framework. This is partly due to a
lack in process methods that have the sensitivity to pick up the intricacies of a decision
strategy. Our study has demonstrated that by using neural pattern analysis, we can
potentially start distinguishing decision strategies on a neural level. By combining neural
pattern analysis with other sensitive process measures, such as eye-tracking (see Kim,
Seligman, and Kable 2012), we can potentially start identifying the neural signatures of
different decision strategies to start testing why individuals use certain decision strategies to
make a decision.
In summary, our study furthers our understanding of how different forms of
cognitive demand are neurally represented. Our different manipulations of difficult decisions
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activated regions throughout the MD system. Yet, when we looked at the pattern of neural
activity on a voxel level, we found evidence for distinct patterns of activation for our
manipulations. Taken together, our study suggests that although different forms of cognitive
demand recruit a common set of brain regions, these different demands recruit these regions
in different ways.
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Figure 1. Illustration of each manipulation and the manipulation check. (A) Example of each
manipulation type. (B) Illustration of what subject saw when prompted to enter their
subjective ratings of difficulty.
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Figure 2. Anatomical ROIs of the multiple demand system. ACC, anterior cingulate cortex;
IFGop, opercular part of the inferior frontal gyrus; MFG, middle frontal gyrus; MFGorb,
orbital part of the middle frontal gyrus; ParInf, the inferior parietal cortex; ParSup, the
superior parietal cortex; PrecG, precentral gyrus; SMA, supplementary motor area.
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Figure 3. Manipulation check and response times. (A) Average subjective ratings of
difficulty for each manipulation and its corresponding easy controls. (B) Median response
times for each manipulation and its corresponding easy controls. * p < .05; Error bars
represent SEMs.
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Figure 4. BOLD activity for the hard > easy contrasts. (A) Neural regions activating for the
hard > easy contrast for each of the 4 manipulations (z > 2.3, cluster corrected at p < .05).
The activation map shows the overlay of the four hard > easy contrast maps. Brighter colors
indicate greater number of tasks overlapping. Three manipulations overlap in dmPFC and
parietal cortex. (B) Unique activation for each of the manipulations. To find unique
activation for disfluency, we first combined the hard > easy contrast maps for the other three
manipulations. We then subtracted the combined hard > easy contrast map from the
disfluency hard > easy contrast map. We then did this for the other three manipulations.
Unique activation for disfluency is in yellow. Unique activation for multioption is in red.
Unique activation for time pressure is in green.
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Figure 5. Average responses across subjects (expressed in percent BOLD signal change
relative to baseline) of individually defined fROIs. The darker shades of each represent
average responses estimated from an fROI defined by the same manipulation. The lighter
shades of each color represent average responses estimated from an fROI defined by a
different manipulation. * p < .05; ^ p < .10; Error bars represent SEMs.
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Figure 6. Multi-voxel pattern similarity analysis of the multiple demand system. Dark gray
bars represent the mean correlations between the same manipulations (within-manipulation
correlations). Light gray bars represent that mean correlations between different
manipulations (between-manipulation correlations). ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; IFGop,
opercular part of the inferior frontal gyrus; MFG, middle frontal gyrus; MFGorb, orbital part
of the middle frontal gyrus; ParInf, the inferior parietal cortex; ParSup, the superior parietal
cortex; PrecG, precentral gyrus; SMA, supplementary motor area. Error bars represent
SEMs. * p < .05, ^ p < .10
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Figure 7. Searchlight analysis of similarity measures. First column of results are brain maps
of areas showing significant similarities in the pattern of activity between different
manipulations. Second column of results are brain maps of areas showing significant
similarities in activity between the same manipulation. Third column of results are brain
maps of areas that show greater significantly greater similarities for the within manipulation
patterns compared to the between manipulation patterns.
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Disfluency

Multioption

Time Pressure

within

between

within

between

0.01*

0.13

0.26

0.04*

0.52

IFGop

< 0.01*

< 0.01*

< 0.01*

0.09^

Insula

0.01*

0.01*

< 0.01*

MFG

0.11

0.01*

MFGorb

0.38

ACC

within

between

Value Difference
within

between

0.11

0.76

0.74

0.36

0.02*

0.94

0.97

0.02*

0.09

0.02*

0.60

0.89

0.19

0.01*

0.56

0.01*

0.33

0.75

0.01*

0.20

0.05^

0.44

< 0.01*

0.25

0.09^

ParInf

< 0.01*

< 0.01*

< 0.01*

< 0.01*

0.03*

< 0.01*

0.55

0.69

ParSup

< 0.01*

< 0.01*

0.02*

< 0.01*

0.30

0.04*

0.08^

0.96

PrecG

< 0.01*

0.01*

< 0.01*

0.03*

0.63

0.15

0.69

0.83

SMA

0.20

0.04*

0.04*

0.04*

0.71

0.02*

0.91

0.69

Table 1. Results of the t-tests for the hard > easy contrast for each of the 4 manipulations in
each of the fROIs from Fig. 5. * p < .05, ^ p < .10. Values are bolded for ease of
visualization.
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CHAPTER 5 – General discussion

Overall Summary
In this dissertation, I have described research in which we explored the processes that are
involved with constructing preferences during decision making. Although the idea of constructed
preferences has been around in psychology for decades, this dissertation demonstrated how new
techniques, eye-tracking and fMRI, can further elucidate the processes that lead to decisions in
different contexts. In chapter 2, we found that preference reversals in response to changes in response
mode were also accompanied by changes in visual attention. These results support that the contingent
weighting of attributes can at least explain part of the construction processes that lead to preference
reversals. In chapter 3, we highlight how eye-tracking can be especially useful in detecting subtle
changes in constructing preferences. We found that in response to increasing number of options, all of
our subjects reduced the option set to make a decision. Critically, those experiencing time pressure
tended to then use a simpler decision strategy to make their decisions, while those without time
pressure tended to employ a compensatory strategy. Finally, in chapter 4, we used fMRI data and
multivariate pattern analysis to demonstrate that we are able to distinguish on a neural level the
different responses to different forms of decision complexity.
The results from this dissertation also opened up many further questions for exploration.
Below, I will outline a number of questions and implications that arose from the studies in each of the
three chapters.
Why people choose certain strategies
Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated that eye-tracking data can elucidate the processes involved
with constructing preferences and can identify the strategies people use when making a decision.
Chapter 4 demonstrated that these decision processes can be distinguished on a neural level using
multivariate pattern analysis. A crucial future direction is to then understand why people use certain
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construction processes or decision strategies to make a decision. As alluded to in chapters 2 and 3,
many different strategies have been proposed, often times for the same decision context. Yet, even as
more strategies are uncovered, we still understand very little about why people engage in one strategy
over another or why different strategies have been observed in response to similar demands.
Many theoretical frameworks have been proposed for why subjects engage in different
decision strategies. Many of these frameworks are based on the idea of “bounded rationality,” the
notion that humans have limitations on their capacity for processing information (Simon, 1955).
These frameworks are similar in that they involve some sort of tradeoff between the amount of
“cognitive effort” to put forth and the desire to make a good or accurate decision. A few examples of
these frameworks are the adaptive decision maker (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1993), effortreduction (Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008), and resource-rationality (Lieder and Griffiths, 2015). A
major assumption in most of these frameworks is that decision strategies can be decomposed into
units of cost, so an overall effort or information processing cost can be quantified for different
decision strategies (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1993). Since eye-tracking can elucidate what
information people are processing and the pattern in which they are processing the information and
neural patterns of activity can serve as a measure of different strategies, future investigations can use
eye-tracking and fMRI to start quantifying the overall costs associated with each decision strategies.
However, it is important to note that the other key component of these frameworks is the accuracy of
the decision or the desire to make a good decision. In order to fully test the assumptions of these
frameworks, future research also needs to figure out a way to quantify “accuracy” or “good decision.”
Directionality of the influence between fixations and preferences
In chapter 2, although we found that preference reversals are accompanied by changes in
visual attention, we do not know the directionality of the influence. These differences in fixations
might only be an index of the differential weighting of attributes, or alternatively, might also be the
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cause of the differential weighting of the attributes. The latter possibility raises some interesting
questions for future exploration. If visual attention influenced attribute weighting, then we may be
able to reduce or eliminate preference reversals if we forced subjects to look equally at the two
attributes. Previous work has found that fixating on an option makes people more likely to choose it
(Armel, et al., 2008). Along these lines, we can also manipulate how much subjects fixate on specific
attributes to test how these differences in fixation affect overall preference judgments.
Effects of construction processes on the neural computation of value
Recent meta-analytic work has found a common neural currency, a “utility” like neural signal
in ventral striatum and ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), that tracks the subjective value
people place on different rewards during decision making (Bartra, McGuire, and Kable, 2013). An
important next step would be to examine how activity in these areas changes in response to changes
in the construction processes that lead to a decision. In particular, an interesting question is whether
these value-related areas reflect the differential weightings on probabilities and amounts during
choices and bids. Thus, in a preference reversal paradigm (chapter 2), neural activity in ventral
striatum and vmPFC might be more strongly affected by probabilities during choices and more
strongly affected by amounts during bids.
In chapter 3, we demonstrated more complicated processes for constructing preferences.
Predictions for how these processes affect neural value computation may not be as straightforward as
the predictions for the contingent weighting hypothesis. One prediction would be that BOLD activity
in these value regions might just reflect the expected value or utility of the chosen option, which is
possible for those subjects who used a compensatory to make a decision. However, in those subjects
who rely on just one attribute to make a decision, we might also find BOLD activity to be more
strongly affected by the particular attribute than was used to make a decision. Additionally, in chapter
3, our eye-tracking data demonstrated that subjects first evaluated probabilities then moved on a
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different strategy before making a choice. An interesting question would be to see if BOLD activity in
these value regions tracks these different stages of the decision processes (e.g., track probability in the
beginning of the trial, then track expected utility of the option at the end). An fMRI study testing this
particular question would involve using both eye-tracking and fMRI at the same time, and would also
involve careful timing due to lags in the hemodynamic response.
Construction processes of preferences in a natural setting
In chapters 2 and 3, we measured the processes of constructing preferences in a laboratory
environment, which allowed us to isolate and control all variables of interests and make very precise
eye movement measurements. However, a laboratory setting may not be representative of the kinds of
environments in which people typically make decisions. Future research also needs to examine how
well our findings from chapters 2 and 3 generalize to less well-controlled settings. Our analysis
techniques can be paired with advances in mobile eye-tracking technology (Boening et al., 2006;
Bulling and Gellerson, 2010) to further investigate the construction processes to a wider variety of
decision making settings. For instance, future studies could examine decisions that involve many
options in grocery stores, restaurants, car dealerships, or other consumer settings. These settings can
also provide a more thorough understanding of how visual displays or product placement affects
visual attention and preferences, since visual displays in these settings will not be as carefully
controlled as it was in a laboratory setting.
Distinguishing construction processes not involved with increasing demand on a neural level
Chapter 4 demonstrated that we are able to distinguish different manipulations of cognitive
by investigating the neural patterns. Chapter 3 demonstrated that we are able to identify and measure
different decision strategies. However, we focused these investigations only on decision contexts that
involved increasing the demands of the task and focused our analyses on a set of neural regions that
are known to respond to cognitive demand. An interesting next step would involve testing whether we
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can identify different decision strategies, using both eye-tracking and fMRI, from decision tasks that
do not involve increasing demand (e.g., framing effects, other changes in response modes, changes in
presentation formats). In this type of investigation, searchlight analysis over the whole brain might be
a useful strategy in identifying different decision strategies outside of predefined neural regions of
interests.
Conclusion
The research described here focused on the cognitive and neural processes of constructed
preferences. We introduced new methodological and analytical techniques to further our
understanding of how preferences are constructed. A detailed understanding of how people construct
preferences is important in understanding how the circumstances of the decision environment affect
our overall preferences and choices.
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